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SPECTATOR
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
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THE FORTNIGHTLY

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THE FORTNIGHTLY

SEPTEMBER, 1949

DISMANTLING IN WESTERN GERMANY

BY SPECTATOR

THE issue of the dismantling of industrial plant for reparations—never far below the surface of the German picture in the last three and a half years—has been particularly prominent in the recent election campaign in the three western zones. Almost certainly it will be one of the earliest items on the agenda of the new West German Government. The Allies have laid down that the government should concern itself primarily with domestic issues. But, as the Germans are already pointing out, no restriction of that kind is a practical possibility because almost every phase of German life has, since 1945, become entangled with the policies of the occupying powers. The question of dismantling is a case in point. The Germans see this very much as a “domestic issue”—immediately in terms of work and wages for thousands of their countrymen, ultimately in relation to its impact on Germany’s chances of economic survival. For any party or any government in Germany to ignore the dismantling question would be tantamount to political suicide.

But, before considering why this question of dismantling, or *démontage* as the Germans call it, has aroused such fierce resentment, it is worth looking at its origins. It was at Yalta, early in 1945, that the Americans, the Russians and ourselves decided—against a background of memories of the failure of the 1918 reparations policy based on a fixed monetary payment—that this time reparations should be paid in kind. It was the intention of the Allies, as President Truman said at Potsdam in July 1945, “to remove from Germany everything which might enable her to prepare a new war,” and “to assist in the reconstruction of the devastated countries.” These principles were duly embodied in the Potsdam Agreement, which added that payment of reparations should leave enough resources available to enable the Germans to subsist without external aid.

The extent of these resources was duly agreed in March 1946 by the four powers occupying Germany, on the supposition that Germany would, as agreed at Potsdam, be treated as an economic unit, and the expressed intention of the Allies at that time was to complete the reparations programme by January 1948. Had this been done there would have been less widespread resentment in western Germany than there is today. In fact dismantling continues

eighteen months after it was intended to have finished with it ; and, if the present programme is carried out, it may not be ended for another two years.

Why this delay ? In part it has been due to Allied disagreements. The plan for the future level of German industry agreed by the four occupying powers in March 1946 specified some 1,600 industrial plants as surplus to Germany's future needs and consequently to be available as reparations. But in June 1947, with no prospect of Germany being treated as an economic unit, the 1946 plan was revised by the three western Allies. One of the consequences of this revision was a series of changes in the lists of factories available as reparations. Some names on the original lists were removed ; other names appeared on new lists. In effect the number of plants now declared surplus and available as reparations was almost halved—from 1,600 to 858.

That so many factories should be spared demolition was naturally welcomed by the Germans. But this did not alter the fact that owners and workers in nearly 800 factories had, for close on two years, been living under the threat of losing their properties and their jobs. But even now, with Russia out of the picture, arguments continued between the French, the Americans and ourselves about how much industrial equipment should be taken out of Germany and how much should be left. Only in April this year were these differences finally resolved.

But these arguments only partly explain why dismantling was not finished by January 1948. All through the months of inter-Allied argument there remained a hard core of factories always destined for removal as reparations. That they had not all disappeared from Germany by the beginning of last year was due to the cumbersome procedure by which they are shared out among those countries which claim them. When the Allies have decided to make a certain plant available as reparations they notify the Inter-Allied Reparations Agency in Brussels, and that body then calls for bids from its nineteen member States. Close inspection of the plant in question is made before bids are put in. It may be that a bid will be for only part of a factory, which means delay while disposal of the remainder is settled. Only when the plant has been finally allocated does the actual process of dismantling begin. Which means that months, if not years, are likely to pass between the date on which a factory may be sentenced to removal and the beginning of its actual disappearance. All this time it is a constant irritant to the workers. They may stay at their benches, knowing that sooner or later they will lose their jobs ; or, idle, they may be forced to watch their silent factory day after day, month after month, its machinery rusting and grass growing high in the yards, until the demolition squads

eventually begin ripping out its machinery and, often, tearing down the buildings. And even this may not be the end. Once dismantled, plant may remain on the site for months before being finally carried off. Up to the end of June this year just over 750,000 tons of industrial equipment had been dismantled in the British Zone. But only half of it had been loaded and dispatched.

Here is an example of how Allied disagreements and consequent changes of policy, combined with delay in disposing of plant as reparations, affects the Germans in practical, human terms. The Hoesch steelworks at Dortmund appeared in the original list of plants to be removed as reparations drawn up by the four powers in 1946. But towards the end of that year the British authorities, having reconsidered the potential steel-making capacity of western Germany, stated that, after all, the Hoesch works would not be dismantled. Yet six months later, in June 1947, the works appeared on the revised British-American-French list of plant to be removed from Germany. Behind those cold, official facts was this picture. Hoesch employed some 6,000 workers. Taking an average of two dependants for each worker—a conservative estimate—it may be said that 18,000 souls looked, directly or indirectly, to Hoesch for their livelihood. That figure does not include the 2,500 pensioners on the books of the firm. An estimate of one dependant for each pensioner accounts for an additional 5,000 human beings. Thus, in all, the lives of some 23,000 men, women and children were bound up with the fate of the Hoesch works. Again, in one form or another, the firm provided 40 per cent. of the municipal revenue of Dortmund. Yet at the time the Hoesch works were first placed on the list for removal, no information was forthcoming about alternative employment for its workers, future payment of pensions, or how the Dortmund municipality was going to find alternative revenue. There were vague suggestions that the workers might be found other employment possibly five to ten miles, or even more, from their homes. At best this would have meant further overburdening the already decrepit transport system, apart from the consequent extra expense. At worst, it was hinted, the workers might have to move their homes nearer their new places of employment—when they were found, at a time when living room, even in cellars, was at a premium. About the pensioners nothing was said. As for Dortmund's municipal budget, the only prospect seemed to be an even larger deficit than already existed. To-day a great part of the Hoesch works, including two electric blast furnaces, some wire-drawing plant and part of the forging plant, is being dismantled. But about the workers, the pensioners, and the municipal budget of Dortmund there is silence.

Such has been the impact on a city of half a million inhabitants of Allied reparations policy in respect of only one works—although a

major one—in the place. How much sharper, then, is the impact on a smaller centre, like Hagen or Siegen, of a decision to remove perhaps the biggest of three works in the town ?

Nor has the prospect of losing their jobs or their pensions been made any more palatable to the German workers by the actual methods used in dismantling their factories. A classic example is that of the Schiess Defries machine-tool works at Duesseldorf, which was allocated to Russia. Here not only the plant was removed, but the factory buildings were demolished as well, so that the massive steel piers and girders could be shipped to the Soviet Union. Everything went ; the rails in the yards were ripped up, and even tiles from the workers' lavatories were chipped off the walls. At Krupp's most modern steel rolling mills at Essen-Borbeck, also destined for Russia, the beds of the mills were blasted out of the ground so that the steel in them could be cut into small sections. That steel can never be used again, and is fit only for scrap when it reaches Russia. Yet the Russians announced that they were not interested in thousands of tons of high quality steel ingots lying a few yards away.

But the Russians were not responsible for what happened in the main section of the Krupp works. Here were two very similar machine-shops, of massive construction and cathedral-like vastness, each containing many thousands tons of steel in its structure alone. One of the two had been the birthplace of Hitler's heaviest guns—naval weapons and the famous Sebastopol gun. The other had been designed for the building of tanks. Each thus came within the categories of plant which the Germans are no longer allowed to possess. The Germans have never seriously contested that plant and buildings designed specifically for the production of war material should be removed. But, in this case, they pointed out that the great amount of steel in the structures of the two buildings—let alone the millions of bricks—would be invaluable for reconstruction work. The bricks could be used to repair or rebuild workers' flats in Essen, while many of the steel girders could be removed, almost as they were, and used for bridge-building. British officials supervising the liquidation of Krupp regarded these as reasonable proposals. But they were overruled. It was decreed that the gunshop should be blown up—not only the gun-producing plant it contained, but bricks, girders and all. Instead of being used to repair or build Rhine bridges those girders have gone to swell the 50,000 tons of ferrous scrap from Krupp that have, in the words of the official British report, been “made available for export.” There was more than 12,000 tons of it in June alone. Meanwhile the former tank-shop, which was converted for the repair of railway locomotives soon after the end of the war, is still devoted to that work. But it, too, is under sentence—although suspended—because it contains cranes and

other equipment originally used to build tanks. But, as a British official there remarked, the type of building and equipment needed to build tanks or repair modern locomotives is not very different ; logically, therefore, the only way to make sure no tanks are built in western Germany would be to remove all structures and equipment capable of handling heavy locomotives.

In recent weeks the removal of certain synthetic oil plants has aroused especially violent controversy in western Germany. As in the case of the Krupp machine-shops, the Allied view is that these oil installations were designed for purely strategic reasons, and that they must therefore be prohibited to Germany in future. On paper all four occupying powers have maintained this view since they first set out, in March 1946, what industries would be allowed to remain in Germany, and what would be banned. But in this case the Germans do not accept the view that their synthetic oil industry has only military importance. They point to the fact that the Leuna works—now in the Russian Zone—existed before Hitler came to power, and claim that if the synthetic oil industry was further developed in later years it was as part of the efforts to conserve foreign exchange. Whatever the rights or wrongs of this particular argument—and the German thesis is not altogether convincing—it is a fact that the British authorities actually encouraged the Germans to repair and restart production at two of the plants it has now been decided to remove. In one of these two cases 17,000,000 marks, or about £1,300,000, has been invested by the Germans in rehabilitation. Now half of this expensively revived plant is to go. When the Germans protested at this particular decision, pointing out the large sums that had been spent, the official British reply was that that was “ a business risk.”

In any case, apart altogether from the original reasons for its expansion, the Germans claim that to-day the synthetic oil industry plays an essential part in their economy. The western Allies maintain that, by 1944, the synthetic oil industry was providing half the liquid fuel requirements of Germany. The Germans claim that only 2.2 per cent. of their wartime oil supplies came from works using the Fischer-Tropsch process, the more important of the two main methods used in Germany to produce oil from coal. To-day, in contrast, they maintain that the Fischer-Tropsch plants and other installations banned by the Allies, provide chemical basic materials widely used in German industry. They supply crude paraffin for the detergent and cleanser industries, and paraffin wax used for impregnation in the paper and textile trades, and for raincoats and other forms of protective clothing. This wax is also used for the insulation of electric cables, and in the production of ointments, polishes and varnishes. Parallel removal of important chemical

works will, in the German view, seriously threaten the supply of artificial fertilisers in western Germany. The Germans claim that the Allies have, by implication, admitted the importance of these industries to the German economy by allowing two synthetic oil plants, later to be removed, to continue in production until the end of this year to help alleviate the present severe shortage of soap products in western Germany, while a third plant is to be allowed to carry on with the synthesis of ammonia and methanol indefinitely. Further, the Germans point to a recent proposal by the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization that Germany should continue to produce synthetic fats for industrial purposes in view of the present world shortage of fats.

Mr. Bevin has said that the aim of British policy is the creation of an independent and democratic Germany within the framework of Western Union, and the economic restoration of at least western Germany within the Marshall Plan. The Germans maintain that the policy of dismantling their factories does not fit in with those aims, and that it is likely to destroy any chances there may be that democracy will take root in the three western zones. This is because the average German doubts the honesty of Allied statements about dismantling. He suspects it is traceable more to the intentions of the Allies to prevent German competition with their own industries than to remove Germany's industrial war potential, or make reparation to the countries devastated by Hitler. The Germans also claim that dismantling is uneconomic, both for Germany herself and for the ultimate recipients of the demolished factories. In present conditions it is not possible, in the German view, to lay down any hard and fast conditions about what amount of industrial capacity will allow Germany to exist without external aid. The Allies have already had to revise their original estimates. In any case economic theory seldom works out very neatly in practice. The economic position of Britain to-day compared with the forecasts of the Economic Survey is one proof of that fact. It may be, as the Allies have claimed, that the production of coal from oil, or the use of roof girders from Krupp to repair bridges, is too costly. But, in present conditions, the question is not whether such things are cheaper in the sense of whether they cost more or less money ; it is whether they are cheaper in terms of foreign exchange. For instance, is it cheaper, in those terms, to export girders from Krupp in the form of scrap and then be obliged, by the steel shortage in western Germany, to buy railway trucks abroad ? Or to close down synthetic oil production and import oil in its place ? To the Germans the answers are, in present conditions, clearly in the negative. As for the recipients of industrial plant removed from Germany, if they urgently need, say machine-tools, is it not better that German factories should produce them

than that those factories should be closed and transported to a new site, thus interrupting production for many months ?

The question of whether or not industrial plant should be dismantled and removed from Germany has already been decided by the Allies. It is not the intention of this article to discuss the merits of that decision so much as to illustrate, from the writer's personal experience in Germany, why local opposition to it is so strong. The Russians have ruthlessly stripped eastern Germany of industrial equipment. But they have recognized the psychological value of speed, and of completing, or appearing to complete, their dismantling programme. One of the main grounds of western German opposition to dismantling is that it is still going on, more than four years after the end of the war. To have permitted that delay, whatever its causes, has been the cardinal mistake made by the western Allies. Another error has been to omit, as in the case of the Hoesch works at Dortmund, to make and announce detailed plans of alternative provision for the displaced workers and pensioners. This "bread and butter" aspect of the dismantling problem has been consistently ignored by the Allies. They have failed to realize that a worker in a factory about to be dismantled is quite unmoved when told that it is to disappear as the result of some high-level agreement in London, Paris or Washington. What he wants to know is where his wages and his pension will come from in future. And that is a question the vast Allied information services have never really answered. Finally, the Allies have failed to convince the Germans of the genuineness of the principles, either ethical or economic, upon which the dismantling programme is based. Nothing is heard by the Germans—or indeed by anyone else—of the ultimate fate of the plant taken out of western Germany as reparations ; if it is, in fact, assisting in the reconstruction of the devastated countries. For all the Germans know that plant may be rusting on railway sidings all over Europe. Altogether, the Allies have not, since 1945 devoted nearly as much attention to the psychological approach to the Germans as they did during the war. Had they done so over the dismantling issue there would be fewer hard feelings about the western Allies among the Germans than there are to-day ; and the future of western Europe would have been that much brighter.

WAR ECONOMY IN THEORY AND PRACTICE

BY PAUL EINZIG

IN 1940 Great Britain came to within an inch of being defeated by Hitler. It is true, in the eleventh hour her cornered army was evacuated from Dunkirk, and the Battle of Britain was won, but only just. The margin between victory and defeat was so narrow that a few chance circumstances might easily have turned the scales against us. There can be little doubt that one of the main reasons, if not the main reason, why the existence of the British nation became thus endangered was the lack of adequate economic preparation before the war, not only in the sense of increasing the economic war potential, but also in the sense of establishing the necessary theoretical foundations of British war economy.

An imposing volume on the subject* published in the official civil history of the war series, gives an interesting and readable account of the inadequacy of economic war preparations in time of peace ; of the bad start during the " phoney war " ; and of the slowness of the progress even during the period of the supreme national effort that followed Dunkirk. Above all, it discloses the absence of an adequate theoretical preparation for war economy, which was probably largely responsible for most of our economic deficiencies, especially during the early part of the war.

The root of the trouble was that the economic lessons of the 1914-1918 war were never studied properly. It is true, wartime inflation had an extensive literature between the wars, but many other fundamental problems of war economy were almost completely neglected. There was, for instance, the lesson taught by the food position in Germany towards the end of the 1914-1918 war. " Before the war," the authors observe, " the Germans were importing less than ten per cent. of their food. Their losses of overseas food imports were a small thing in comparison with the losses they inflicted on themselves by their failure to maintain home production." It would be no exaggeration to say that this mistake more than any other single cause was responsible for Germany's defeat. Had this been duly taken into account, the mistaken conception that it would be possible to force Hitler to surrender by means of blockade, which was the

**British War Economy*, by W. K. Hancock and M. M. Gowing. H.M. Stationery Office. 21s.

basis of Allied strategy from September 1939 till May 1940, might not have been adopted.

The disinclination of economists to study these lessons was a not unnatural reaction after the end of the first war. In any case, many urgent and difficult peace problems claimed their attention. By the time it became evident that a second war was a mere question of time, much of the experience gained between 1914 and 1918 had faded into oblivion. Moreover, British economists at any rate were utterly reluctant to face the realities of the new war menace. While in Germany a vast economic literature developed during the middle 'thirties, under the name of *Wehrwirtschaft*, which discussed extensively every economic aspect of rearmament and war, most British writers qualified to deal with the subject preferred to bury their heads in the sand. When in 1937 the present writer criticized them on that account in a Foreword contributed to a book by P. M. Rae on *The £ s. d. of National Defence*, a reviewer of the book in *The Economist* virtually accused us both of war-mongering. The view was held in quarters which should have known better that there was no fundamental difference between the economic problems of peace and those of war.

It was not until after Munich that the need for discussing war economy came to be realized ; and even the extent to which expert attention was focussed publicly on the subject in Great Britain was negligible. By that time the subject was of course engaging the attention of Government departments and Cabinet committees. Their discussions, conducted behind closed doors, were shielded, however, from constructive criticism. Those involved were mostly members of the higher civil service, with very few economists amongst them. It was not until after the outbreak of war that a whole army of economists joined the Government departments. Even then, most of them occupied, to begin with, subordinate positions with no authority based on seniority or experience to enable them to make their views felt. Before the war, an impenetrable barrier of official secrecy kept apart those who knew a great deal about the nature of the practical problems which would have to be faced in case of war, and those who possessed the broad theoretical background that would have assisted in finding the right solution of those problems.

The Government's undertaking in publishing valuable material bearing on war economy should go a long way towards preventing the repetition of this experience. For one thing, it places on record problems the existence of which was vaguely surmised before 1939, but which could not be discussed outside Government departments for lack of sufficient concrete information. In addition to the published material, various Government departments are understood to have written or are writing their respective departmental history of

the war. For the Treasury, for instance, this formidable task was placed in the competent hands of Professor R. G. Hawtrey. The need for such detailed records for departmental use is duly illustrated by the fact that at one moment during the war, when the Government was faced by the need for taking an urgent decision on the policy to be pursued in India regarding silver, there was nobody either at the Treasury or in the India Office who could remember what was done in that respect between 1914 and 1918. It is a pity that the highly valuable departmental war records which are being prepared to prevent a recurrence of such anomalies, cannot be published in full. The material released for publication in the present volume, and in the volumes that are to succeed it, should go a long way, however, to assist in the critical discussion of problems of war economy.

Although the absence of adequate theoretical knowledge obtained through such discussion before the war was largely responsible for the initial deficiencies of the British war economy, it would be a mistake to suggest that with the aid of adequate knowledge the right course would always necessarily have been taken. The reasons for the slow pace with which the British economy was adapted to national defence requirements before and during the early part of the war was in fact largely the peace-mindedness of the political heads of the Government. When resisting a demand that agricultural production should be expanded a few months before the war, the Minister of Agriculture in the Chamberlain Government said : " What fools we would look if we were to expand agriculture and there were no war." The inadequacy of economic war preparations in many other spheres during the " phoney " war can be explained on the same grounds. As the authors of *British War Economy* point out in explanation of the delays in the adoption of rationing, " the War Cabinet hesitated to authorize action which would trammel the customary liberties of selling and buying food. Not until nearly two months after the outbreak of war did it agree at last to the rationing of butter and bacon, of which there were already shortages ; and it still remained unconvinced that meat and sugar rationing were necessary."

Conversion to war economy was firmly opposed by an influential section of the Cabinet, including the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Sir John Simon (as he was then) on the ground that, should it become possible to negotiate peace before a " shooting war " developed, the cost of re-conversion to peace economy would be very high. Exchange control was adopted in a very mild form because both the Treasury and the Bank of England were afraid that drastic control might interfere with London's prospects of resuming its rôle as a world banking centre. The observation of the official economic historians of the war that " it seems in retrospect rather surprising that exporters of capital were handled very gently by the Treasury and that exporters

of goods retained unrestricted freedom to use as they thought fit the foreign currencies accruing to them from their overseas sales," conveys the false impression that at that time these deficiencies in exchange control were not and could not be realized. As a matter of fact, during 1939-1940 the present writer, among others, pointed out this flaw and other defects in published articles and in memoranda to the Treasury. That these loopholes were not dealt with until a later stage of the war was not due to lack of knowledge but to the fact that they preferred to lose valuable foreign exchange rather than depart too drastically from peace economy. In so far as the errors of omission and commission were due to this attitude no amount of additional knowledge would have helped.

The conception that the same rules apply to both war and peace economy, which prevailed among most British economists right up to the outbreak of the war, was the cause of some very costly errors. Outstanding among them was the devaluation of the pound in terms of dollars on the outbreak. That blunder, as the authors recognize, was the main cause of the large initial rise in prices and of the threat of a vicious spiral of inflation. The authors merely register this fact without implying any criticism, yet there was hardly any other action in the economic sphere which deserved sharper censure. The decision to devalue sterling was based on the peacetime experience in competitive currency depreciation, as a result of which the Government took it for granted that, in war, as in peace, the proceeds of exports could be increased through "undervaluing" the national currency. Because currency depreciation in 1931 in Britain and in 1933 in the United States was followed by economic recovery, those in charge of Britain's monetary policy in 1939 took it for granted that the same remedy would also work in wartime conditions. Had this subject been adequately debated before the war, the authorities might have come to realize that, since the limitation of supplies and of shipping facilities were apt to handicap exports, it was useless to try to stimulate exports by devaluing sterling. They might also have concluded that it would be unwise to provoke an initial rise in prices before the machinery for wartime price control was safely established.

On the outbreak of the war the bank rate was raised out of sheer force of peacetime habit, even though no conceivable advantage could be gained through this move. The authors have nothing to say about this subject. Yet it constituted another instance of the mis-application of peace economics. Whether it would be wise to raise the bank rate and whether sterling should be devalued if and when war should break out, were subjects ignored by the economists beforehand. So the Chancellor of the Exchequer had not the benefit of checking the advice tendered to him by his out-of-date official

advisors.

Inadequate statistics were another source of errors in war economy. "In the early months of the war," the authors observe, "the statistical information essential for a comprehensive understanding of the national economy so far from being expanded had been considered a luxury to be curtailed. The Government was not well equipped during the first nine months of war to measure its financial task." It has not until later, under the influence of Keynes, that this omission was repaired through the elaboration of the white paper on National Income and Expenditure published in April 1941.

Admittedly, deficient war economy was to a considerable extent the result of general inefficiency. No special knowledge was required to realize the necessity for reserving essential raw materials for essential war purposes. In spite of this, building licences continued to be granted with little or no discrimination during the early part of the war until the end of 1940. Another instance of administrative inefficiency quoted by the authors was the prolonged mistaken allocation of consumer goods without paying attention to the "unprecedented internal migration of population." In these and many other instances the mistakes were obvious. Had problems of war economy been properly discussed in public before 1939 there might have been more pressure on the Government by well-informed public opinion to repair the omissions.

Let us take, for instance, the case of subsidies. According to the authors, they were originally adopted at the end of 1939 as a purely temporary measure on the understanding that "at the end of say six weeks a series of upward changes in prices should be begun." Never has the delightfully French paradox : *Ce n'est que le temporaire qui dure* proved itself so fully justified. Indeed, the adoption of food subsidies is said to have occurred even more casually than would appear from this official account.

In a general way, better initial knowledge of war economy would have helped new Ministers in 1940 to overcome the obstructionism of some old-fashioned permanent officials who were always ready to produce an intimidating array of arguments why certain measures, however essential to the war effort, should or could not be taken. While in many instances progressive civil servants found themselves handicapped by the ignorance or timidity of their Minister, in other instances Ministers were inclined to be over-awed by the superior knowledge of those officials who opposed unconventional action. It took, in some instances, many months before the Ministers acquired sufficient knowledge of war economics to overrule such objections.

The authors give an interesting instance of the damaging effect of public ignorance of the principles of war economy. During the early part of the war and even later very few people realized that in

wartime conditions of limited manpower and raw material supplies the contractor who made the greater profit on the basis of the same price served the country best, since he produced the same results with less expenditure of national resources. Facts such as this could have been recognized and popularized before the war if war economy had been debated more extensively. To a large extent the agitation against profits was due to the popular misconception that by preventing profiteering inflation could be prevented. The authors point out that the Government had to take into account this popular sentiment by trying to freeze prices current at the outbreak of the war even though in doing so without the simultaneous application of controls and rationing, a tendency to reduce supply and stimulate demand was brought about. Likewise, in an effort to exercise rigid control over profits, the incentive to efficiency and economy was reduced. However, possibly political and psychological considerations made it advisable to curtail war profits irrespective of economic considerations.

It is to be hoped that the material supplied by this volume and by subsequent volumes in this series on Production, Food, Economic Blockade, Shipping, Agriculture, Fuel and Power, Manpower, Raw Materials, will give rise to heated controversies over the various problems of war economy. To that end it would be advantageous if the application of the Official Secrets Act in the case of economists in Government service during the war should be relaxed somewhat in order to enable them to criticize the official material now released on the basis of their personal experience. During the war it was widely hoped that when the economists left Government service after the war they would be able to make valuable contributions to the literature of war economy. So far, these hopes have failed to materialize to any considerable extent. The lamented death of Keynes was a severe blow also from this point of view. There are, however, many other economists who could do useful work but for the ban placed on the publication of their knowledge acquired while holding official positions. Even though this ban cannot be expected to be removed altogether it should be exercised more liberally.

Gratitude is due to the joint authors of the present volume which, without being able to go into full details, has disclosed much hitherto unavailable information for the benefit of the student of war economy. In spite of its many omissions—some of them perhaps inevitable, others less so—it constitutes a most valuable contribution to the literature on the subject.

MR. VOIGT'S PAX BRITANNICA

BY MAX BELOFF

And 'mid this tumult Kubla heard from far
Ancestral voices prophesying war.

THE theory that the wartime alliance between the Atlantic powers and the U.S.S.R. could lead to a period of peacetime co-operation has been shown to be based on fallacious notions about the nature of Soviet foreign policy, propagated throughout Great Britain and the U.S.A., under the highest patronage. Much of Europe has been liberated from the bestial tyranny of Germany only to fall into the firmer and subtler grip of Soviet Communism. In those countries that are still free under the protection of a benevolent America, fifth columns exist. In Asia ordered government is being challenged in the interests of advancing Communism and of upsetting the precarious economic structure of European countries that have depended upon access to its produce. In Britain, whose resistance was the primary cause of the German defeat, a Government is in power which, however good its intentions, and however capable its leaders of learning the imperative lessons of the present, cannot escape from the past, and cannot at short notice persuade a tired people to forget what socialist propaganda has been hammering into them for two generations, cannot make clear in fact, that what is at stake is not the speed at which the standard of living can be raised, but the very foundations of Britain's survival as a free community. Whatever else may be objected against Mr. Voigt's views as stated in his new book, few but the incurably frivolous will deny his main point, that "for England, as for no other of the Great Powers, the final failure of foreign policy is final downfall."

Mr. Voigt has certainly the right to be heard when he speaks on the subject of British foreign policy; and his book is one which will be, and should be, widely read. This does not mean that it is a good book. Indeed, Mr. Voigt is not content merely to attack the views of those with whom he disagrees, but to do it in a manner which makes no concessions even to those who might otherwise go more than half-way to meet him. He is capable of writing narrative that is not only clear but often intensely moving. But in argument, besides a tendency to pile abstraction on abstraction in a way

reminiscent of an undergraduate drunk on Hegel, he is capable of a shrill assertiveness that can only be maintained with the aid of a plethora of italics that would have done credit to Queen Victoria herself. But it is not merely a question of literary taste. It is rather that Mr. Voigt shows what can only be described as a contempt for history, doubly curious in one who thinks of himself as continuing Burke's struggle with the ideologies.

This manifests itself in little things, as also in larger ones. But most important of all, this contempt for history has dictated the form of the book as it now reaches us. It consists, apart from the introductory and concluding chapters on British policy, of two essays on Germany and Russia between which are sandwiched long narrative chapters on our wartime relations with Poland, Greece and Yugoslavia. The whole thing was composed, we learn, between 1943 and 1947 and much of it appears substantially in the form in which it was originally published between these dates. Apart from a few corrections in proof, made early in 1948, there has been no substantial revision of these chapters since they were originally written. Even in these days of publishing delays, there is no technical excuse for a book on problems of foreign policy that ignores completely the developments of the past two years, and the publications that have appeared in the interim, throwing light on the topics that are in fact dealt with in the narrative.

There is no indication of the process by which the West German State might have been likely to come to birth. There is (in a book that concentrates on the "Middle Zone") no hint of the advent or the significance of "Titoism". Nor does Mr. Voigt excuse himself on technical grounds. He is so sure that he is right, that he knows precisely and conclusively what happened and why, that he does not even mention the possibility that other accounts may cast fresh light upon the matter. It would be better for Mr. Voigt's cause, if to the sincerity of a prophet, he could have added something of the humility of a scholar.

The main burden of his central narrative is that Mr. Churchill, as wartime Prime Minister, gave way unnecessarily to Russia over Poland, helping to force the latter to surrender her rightful territories in the east for acquisitions from Germany that now bind her to Russia with no assurance of security; that by transferring British aid from General Mikhailovich to Marshal Tito, he wantonly handed over Yugoslavia to Soviet rule and, finally, that only a last minute realization of what was afoot prevented the same betrayal of Greece. Even then, action came too late to preserve Greece from the ghastly struggle that still drains her of life and resources.

In the case of Poland, even Mr. Voigt admits that there is a case for arguing that the outcome might not have been very

different, whatever position this country had taken up. If this is so, it is difficult to see how honour would have been served by encouraging the Poles in hopeless resistance to Soviet demands. It is to be noted that Mr. Voigt asserts on the authority of an unnamed member of the war cabinet that the western powers did not take seriously the possibility of a separate Russo-German peace. Whether or not this is true—and one hesitates to be dogmatic—it is at least clear that the Americans were anxious throughout to bring Russia in against Japan and prepared to make important concessions rather than fail in this object. But Mr. Voigt makes no concession to the necessity for ensuring Anglo-American concord as the essential condition of success. He admits indeed, that Mr. Churchill's strategy of using the Italian campaign to enable the western armies to arrive at the Danube was unpalatable to the Americans as being "political" in its motive. But he does not go on as far with this essential argument as the books of General Eisenhower, and Cordell Hull, the Hopkins papers, and we may assume, Mr. Churchill's later volumes, will enable one to, at a later date.

It is Yugoslavia that provides Mr. Voigt with what is the essence of the indictment he draws up against this aspect of our wartime policies. He regards political warfare as practised by this country in the 1939-1945 war (its attempt to stimulate armed attacks against the German occupiers) as demanding an unfair sacrifice of lives for the sake of military gains of a generally insignificant kind. It is, he believes, and with some justice, nonsense to talk about "collaboration" in the case of those who were unwilling to give occasion for massive reprisals that the Allies could do nothing to impede. If the communists provided much of the activity that did take place, it is not because of their greater heroism, but because misery and destruction, while heart-rending to genuine patriots, were a positive advantage to them as they strove to recruit new supporters. He does not allow one to forget that the object of communist "resistance" was never freedom from the Germans for its own sake, but the furthering of the communist cause after victory.

Political warfare is all right for communists, declares Mr. Voigt, since they have a precise political objective; but in the hands of a power concerned to preserve and restore rather than to destroy, it can only be dangerous. The origin of this folly he traces to the preponderance of left-wing ideologists in both our political warfare machine, and at Middle East headquarters, and to their ability to convince their colleagues that our real friends were all to be found on the "left". The subject he raises is an important one. No-one familiar with what might be called the *New Statesman* attitude to foreign policy—and there was a period when *The Times* itself shared many of the same illusions where Russia was concerned—can be

unaware of the deleterious effects on the public mind. But it is hard to imagine Mr. Winston Churchill as the gullible victim of Mr. Kingsley Martin. Once again, Mr. Voigt refuses to allow for the fact that he is only telling one side of the story. He makes specific charges of misleading the British Government against members of the British mission with Marshal Tito. Mr. Fitzroy MacLean's book is due to be published shortly and it is to be hoped that Mr. F. W. Deakin, whose knowledge of Balkan affairs can certainly stand comparison with Mr. Voigt's, will one day tell his own story of those years. Mr. Randolph Churchill's evidence will no doubt supply material for his father's book when this episode comes to be dealt with. Meanwhile, one might be wiser to suspend judgment.

Mr. Voigt's perspective is altogether too limited. If the Americans had taken up and pressed the idea that Yugoslavia should be allotted, with Greece, as an exclusively British sphere of action, instead of opposing when they could all such ideas in favour of a mythical and unworkable co-operation with the Russians everywhere, all might yet have been well. And certainly Mr. Churchill deserves more credit for his action in Greece than Mr. Voigt gives him, when we remember the strong American pressure (born of ignorance and historic prejudice) in favour of *soi-disant* democratic movements and against monarchy of every kind. The American discovery of the realities of communist expansionism, and the consequent Truman doctrine, were still a long way off in December 1944.

While Mr. Voigt's views on events in Poland and the Balkans are clear if not always conclusive, the chapters on Germany and Russia present the reader with a very different problem. Mr. Voigt is not one of those in whom hostility to Communism is a source of forgetfulness of what the Germans have done and would do again if they got the chance. The war was the result of German aggression—made possible by our own sins of omission and “the German record in the war itself was surely the blackest known of a modern civilized nation.” Nor does he subscribe to the popular fiction of the “other Germany”. There is only one Germany, imbued with a fierce patriotism, conceiving freedom as the freedom of Germany from restraint, not of Germans from restraints, welcoming authority and submissive to it, condemning Hitler to-day for his failure, not for his purposes. The ideology of Naziism may have lost its hold but the fundamentals of the German problem remain. This is not a people who can be “educated” into democracy as the English-speaking peoples understand it, or whose goodwill can be purchased by concessions. Nevertheless, for Mr. Voigt, the German people remain an essential component of the Europe we must strive to rebuild. They cannot be excluded for ever. “What then, is the answer to the German problem? That the German idea become

European and that the German order become an organic part of the European order. This is the answer to the German problem."

The oracle has spoken but as is the way with oracles, it requires interpretation. For a clue to Mr. Voigt's meaning we have to turn to his interpretation of Russia. As he has shown in earlier writings, he is to be treated with some deference when he talks of Germany. On Russia, he is much less convincing. He makes a great deal of the point that whereas Germany is a part of Europe, Russia is outside Europe. Indeed the frontier of Europe according to Mr. Voigt, is precisely the frontier between Russia and her neighbours in the inter-war period. To step across it in 1939 was to step across the greatest dividing line in the world. It was not the dividing line between capitalism and Communism but between the Christian world and the non-Christian world: "Europe is the land of God and Caesar, Russia of God-Caesar, and in this they belong to different worlds."

Now, if this is another way of saying that in an age of secular religions, Russia provides the most obvious example of a nation and a State at the service of such a religion, the point is a useful one, if not particularly original. It is important for understanding Soviet policy that we should understand the hold that Marxist theory has over its makers. It is a far more useful angle of approach than that favoured by writers who would have us believe that Soviet policy can be analysed in simple terms of security or interest. But Mr. Voigt goes much further than that, and makes the contrast an absolute one. There seems no sense in which this is true. Secular religions—National Socialism, Fascism and even so-called Democratic Socialism in some of its manifestations—make an appeal far outside the confines of Russia. Indeed the appeal that Soviet Communism makes—and Mr. Voigt is very acute in his remarks on the psychology of fellow-travellers—indicates how universal are the instincts and urges that bring men into its service. To prove that Russia is unique in this regard, he is obliged to treat the whole Russian past as something entirely apart from Europe, something which has with Europe only the single link of Christianity which the Revolution snapped.

This has undoubted polemical advantages. The continuity of Russian expansionism can then be illustrated from pan-Slav writings. But it is profoundly non-historical. It is indeed a measure of Mr. Voigt's contempt for history, that he can dismiss all that side of Russian thought, especially in the nineteenth century which looked to the west, all those events in Russian history from the Decembrist to the March Revolutions, to go no further backwards or forwards, which are unthinkable without reference to the rest of Europe. If one must find a frontier for Europe other than the geographical one, there is perhaps a good reason for seeking it along the outermost rim

of the Roman empire. To attribute transcendental significance to the Treaty of Riga is hardly a serious contribution to historical thinking.

It is worth lingering upon this point because it is directly related to Mr. Voigt's more practical reflections. Holding this view of the Soviet power as alien and expansive, he is preoccupied as is everyone, with the method of halting it. The greatest danger lies in the possibility of an alliance between a revived Germany and Russia. This as he rightly remarks "would be the end, not only of the western countries as independent states, but also of Great Britain as a great power, perhaps even as an independent State, and of the United States as a power in Europe and the Middle East." To avoid it, some advocate in however roundabout a way, what would amount to an alliance between the Atlantic powers and Germany. And this, as Mr. Voigt rightly points out, would mean that the western powers would be dragged into a war for the purpose of restoring to Germany her eastern territories, and would find that they had re-installed Germany as the major military power in Europe.

What then is the alternative? It is here that Mr. Voigt is the victim of his own myth. Russia itself must not be touched, not because Mr. Voigt is opposed to preventive wars as such, but because of his antipathy to all wars waged to impose a way of life upon another people. But what we should do (for our sakes not for theirs) is to liberate all the countries that have been incorporated in the Soviet Union or in the Soviet sphere of influence since 1939, and to reduce Russia again to her frontiers of the inter-war period. In such a Europe a federal "Middle Zone" would create the necessary balance to the might of Germany and of Russia and so restore the historic equilibrium in which Britain's safety lies. (In Asia, as an afterthought, the same end is to be achieved by forcible Anglo-American intervention to secure Chinese unity, presumably under General Chiang Kai-shek.)

It is a little disconcerting after being warned so firmly against the dangerous illusions of the Left, to find that the publicists of the Right have nothing better to offer than another set of illusions, less dangerous perhaps only in that they have less chance of general adoption. The two most obvious points about Mr. Voigt's scheme will occur to everyone. Even if Great Britain were much more powerful than she is to-day and had no other commitments, she could not now remove Russia's control in most of the middle zone without a German alliance which has been ruled out. Sea-power may hold Greece and may enable sufficient help to reach Marshal Tito for Yugoslavian independence to be retained, though Mr. Voigt would hardly welcome Marshal Tito as an ally. But Poland and Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Rumania are beyond the reach of any power except Russia and Germany. Even if their independence were

miraculously restored, there is nothing to suggest that they would be able to avert a new agreement for their partition. So long as Russia and Germany believe it their mission on grounds of ideology or *lebensraum* to dominate other peoples, the middle zone will be dominated by one or other, or by both in conjunction. Until there is a lasting change in the outlook of their mighty neighbours, these lesser peoples have at best a choice of evils. To suggest they have more is to do them a disservice, by encouraging hopeless resistance, and in fact to wage, on behalf of the Right, the irresponsible political warfare that Mr. Churchill is accused of having waged for the sake of the Allied cause.

The important lesson of Mr. Voigt's book does not lie in these fantasies. What is important is that governments that depend increasingly on opinion, as do those of Great Britain and the U.S.A., should take care that the information upon which opinion is to be based, is correct. On the whole, the American Government has shown greater consciousness of its responsibilities in this respect, perhaps because its dependence is greater. Certainly the British press—the most important vehicle of such information—has little to pride itself on over the period with which Mr. Voigt deals. In many respects our democracy is sadly ill-informed, not merely where the millions are concerned, but even as regards the would-be *élite*. Not only our newspapers but our historians and professional students of international relations have a great deal to answer for.

The present international scene is nevertheless a very different one from that which Mr. Voigt bids us survey. It is all very well to take for granted as he does, that the nations of the Atlantic community are interdependent and that we can assume common action. That common action has still to be worked for with an intensity no less unremitting than that of wartime. The problems involved by the new technology both in warfare, and in the economic sphere, are changing the character of international relations and of political thinking at a rapid and dangerous rate. The crudities of Communism may thrive in the new environment more easily than our attempt to combine social progress with individual freedom. We do not know, and we have no particular reason to be optimistic. But of one thing we can be certain, that we shall not find our safety in the mechanical application to the contemporary scene of formulae expressive of the wisdom of the past.

(Mr. Beloff is the author of *THE FOREIGN POLICY OF SOVIET RUSSIA, 1929-1941*, published in two volumes by the Oxford University Press, under the auspices of the Royal Institute of International Affairs.)

THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE UNIVERSITY

BY W. R. NIBLETT

I ONCE heard Dr. Stallybrass trying to explain in a few words to a group of foreign visitors what the Oxford method of education was. "It is," he said, "to live and let live and incidentally learn." It would not be easy to define the liberal ideal more briefly.

I.

Among the fundamentals for which British universities must stand is the idea that a university is a place not only at which subjects are to be studied but in which life is to be lived—and distinctively the life of thought. But reality of living and reality of thinking go together and a university will only be likely to challenge its members at what Sir Walter Moberly calls "the deep level where real decisions are made" if in itself it provides an environment which is alive and warm, in which particles are constantly being shot off from the whirling, colliding atoms. And here, surely, Oxbridge has great advantages over Redbrick: for the collegiate system at very least compels dons and students, science men and arts men, research workers and freshmen to spend more of their time in visible and physical proximity. "We highly approve," says Bacon in *The Advancement of Learning*, "of the education of youth in colleges, for in colleges there is not only a great emulation of youth among their equals, but the teachers have a venerable aspect and gravity, which greatly conduces towards insinuating a modest behaviour." The lack of a venerable aspect and gravity among the teachers may well have a still deeper effect.

Even more important than these things, however, there is a tradition that general questions should be discussed within the university. The descent upon Oxford and Cambridge during every week of term of distinguished men and women in the nation's life has its influence even upon those who never go to hear any one of them speak. Oxford and Cambridge are more really democratic in their atmosphere—once one is inside the walls—than Redbrick. It is easier to make friends and to discuss things at a deep level there than in Redbrick. Even the wearing of the gown along the streets is a help. To the undergraduate and the don even in Morrisian Oxford and the Cambridge of Woolworth and Pye the *raison d'être* of the town is the

university. But no university man or woman in Liverpool or Birmingham or Leeds or Newcastle can deceive himself into thinking that if the university were to close down tomorrow the character and temper of those cities would forthwith be greatly changed.

The intellectual life of Oxbridge is fanned to flame by all sorts of influences other than lectures, organized classes and arrangements consciously made either by the university or the colleges. In Redbrick the quality of the student's understanding and extent of intellectual grasp is apt to be more dependent upon the individual professors and lecturers than at Oxbridge. For if they are alive in imagination and if their interest obviously reaches out beyond their own subject, that will matter a great deal. If they are dark and dead, some at any rate of their students will never come within the range of any other light bright enough to awaken them. In Oxbridge there is always the spirit and beauty of the place working silently.

Nevertheless in the matter of the reality of university life Redbrick has some subtle advantages over Oxbridge. It is less easily possible there perhaps to remain cut off from the problems of our time, to become merely academic and escapist and in the course of time a desiccated don. The undergraduates of Redbrick as a body are still in greater proportion than at Oxbridge drawn from classes typical of English society as a whole. And there is a significant and growing feeling in these universities that the nation needs them—and that even Oxbridge needs them more than it is as yet fully aware, to interpret to it some of the community's most real needs. In more ways than one Oxbridge of recent years has quietly followed the example of Redbrick, with nothing said, in catering for the education of the community.

I believe that a cutting of more channels between Oxbridge and Redbrick is one of the great imperatives of our time, just as is the need for a much more real relationship between our grammar schools and our public schools. One cause of the dearth of such channels between Oxbridge and Redbrick is a fear of the currents which they would allow to flow, and that is very nearly a fear of life itself and the change inseparable from it. If British universities are to be open forums for thrashing out ultimate questions more two-way traffic is needed between the older and the newer, in students, in research workers, in dons. But of course there could be no guarantee that the thrashing out of such questions would be taking place. What is certain is that no university will be an institution where much important discussion of challenging questions takes place unless the potential is high at which people within it are living in the mind—and especially, of course, the intellectual potential. That is an indispensable first objective.

II.

But its attainment is closely bound up with the attainment and preservation of another : the unity of the university. A university which is really discussing live questions will in fact soon begin to feel a new unity. Men and women who are facing issues seriously and who are coming to feel that life is bigger with problems and purposes than they knew, will come before long to feel their own kinship within the university walls. Yet to pretend that most universities in 1949 are unified in this way is to deceive ourselves. One reason why they are not is the sheer size of the contemporary university : the gap between students and staff is apt to be greater in an institution which has, say, 4,000 students and a staff of 400 than in one which has 500 students and a staff of 50. For a staff of 400 is large enough to organize all sorts of activities in the staff quarters separate altogether from student quarters which in any case may in these days be grossly over-crowded and intolerably uncomfortable. Another reason is the separation between university administration and teaching.

A third and far more important cause of disunity is that the programme of studies is so diverse and that those studies are so little in touch with one another. The specialist learns to speak the language of his specialism and subjects, which might at first sight have seemed likely to develop promisingly as links between others, are liable to develop into specialities themselves. Their status and reputation in the eyes of the dominant specialists has indeed largely depended upon their capacity to do so. Geography, economics, education, sociology, during the past 30 years have all followed the natural tendency. Worse still, philosophy itself has in many places been tempted to sell its birthright for a mess of pottage. There is no queen in the hive but the bees are so busily and buzzily at work on their own tasks that they simply haven't time to notice her absence.

The problem which Professor Emmet has called the problem of communication begins for most students while they are still in the sixth form—and may begin even before that in the coming years. In some schools a most valiant attempt is being made to transform religious knowledge in the sixth form into a subject which will nourish understanding and compel boys and girls of 16 and 17 to think in terms of "the wholeness of things." And there is a movement, still in its earliest stages, to introduce simple philosophy into the sixth form curriculum. But the excellence of some of the efforts being made must not blind us to the fact that it is only in some schools that they are happening at all. And even where they are being made, the task itself is too enormous for more than a measure of success to be achieved.

For one of the barriers to communication between arts man and science man, between theologian and linguist and engineer, is the assumption that an analytic method of investigation is the only one which will lead to the real truth about things. A habit of analysis once caught is apt to become all-pervasive. A desire to take things to pieces to see what they are made of or to track down the influences which combined to produce certain happenings in history is a legitimate one. But all too often the analyst assumes that when he has the pieces in his hand he has explained the thing in its wholeness; he assumes that the petals plus the stamens plus the stem *are* the flower and that Milton's poetry is an almost inevitable product of a particular set of religious beliefs, plus puritan theory regarding women, plus a knowledge of Virgil and Dante and Tasso. The detached and inquiring mind of the scholar is highly necessary; but a state of inquiry and detachment is not a desirable one to be in permanently, nor is it appropriate to every occasion.

Indeed, the very possibility of the university study of many subjects—music, or the French lyric, or theology itself—depends upon the existence in the student of moments of receptiveness and understanding which are not themselves the produce of any analytical process. It may not unjustifiably be urged that the distinctive function of the university study of any literature is the training of a sound sense of literary values. But that function can only be carried on at all if the student actually loves some of the books he is examining and criticizing. And the sort of theologian who has no personal commitment, no personal convictions and no personal religious experience has nothing real that he can study even objectively.

The important thing is that the neutrality or detachment which is an essential part of the university approach ought never to pretend to be the only attitude which matters to the student as man or woman, or even as student. A university must be neutral in the sense that within the society of people making it up there should be freedom for the study of all the subjects and for the expression of all the opinions which genuinely seem to matter to men. It may often be the bounden duty of the professor or lecturer who is a Christian to voice unbiassedly the views and arguments of people whose preconceptions about the world and the purpose of life are very different from his own. Members of a university are certainly bound to submit themselves to the evidence, to allow themselves to be carried freely where truth wants to take them. But if a university is nothing but a place in which subjects are studied neutrally and therefore in disciplined isolation from one another, it will be a poor place. Neutrality any more than freedom, can never be an end in itself.

A university must also be a place in which men, or some men, in the

name of this same truth, have a profound concern with the relations between subject and subject, so that life does not remain a series of isolated continents and countries, separated from each other by unexplored seas. Its business is to consider fearlessly the various types of mental activity and make a map of them. It must look at the world outside and diagnose the needs of society in the twentieth century. It must not be afraid of using its intelligence to make a synthesis. It is not enough for it to trace causes of social ills ; it must try to trace without bias possible remedies too. Philosophy must occupy a central and conspicuous place within it, and not a philosophy which is concerned only with the meanings of words and symbols, but with an attempt to find the relationships between things. Every university teacher, and student too, must himself be something more than a subject-specialist. It is his duty also to be a philosopher on his own account.

The fact is that there is often no way between one piece of knowledge and another except through life itself : and if the student becomes too completely a specialist working on the bed of his own bit of the ocean, he may never feel the need for coming up into life at all. So often people in universities go about wearing spectacles specially designed to enable them to see the creatures inhabiting a particular part of the universe. You may encourage them as much as you like to stare through the spectacles at life in general but they will never be able to see without the queerest distortions. Any experiences which come to a student and increase his human understanding will help, for without an active realization of their common humanity no unity among the diversity of university folk can ever arise. But there is hope too from another quarter ; even a humble practical task done on behalf of the university as a whole—collecting money on rag day, prompting for a university play, serving at a refectory table—may help to develop a sense of corporate responsibility. Responsibility is a bridge between action and a sense of the situation which calls for action ; and over that bridge a lot of two-way traffic can cross.

III.

The disunity of the university and the reluctance of so many of its inhabitants to face ultimate questions is closely bound up with the disunity of our society and its unwillingness to kick away the plank and take the plunge. But the university is a selected body of men and women, the majority of them young and with the intellectual courage of youth, who should be passionately dedicated to the cause of finding truth. It is only too easy, however, for the adventure to be limited by the tradition of a department or honours school and even more by a narrow concentration upon the gaining of a research

degree, whether in the sciences or the arts. Institutionalism, as Dean Inge remarked, is a fatally potent antiseptic. It preserves some gains, but it prevents the obsolete from being rectified. But though there may be little passion in many of the university searches for truth now going on, one must not deny the high standard of professional accuracy and thoroughness with which the work is done and ought, of course, to be done.

I remember a matriculation day address given by Lord Eustace Percy in 1943 in which, most nobly as I think, he spoke of the university's stand for truth.

We are communities of scholars, working together to find truth. Our danger is that we may care much for professional truth, but little for the whole truth. Our best product has been the sensitive professional conscience, trained to work accurately in one chosen field. That is much ; but it is much less than scholarship. The scholar is pledged to prove all things, to measure his every word and act by the most exact standard of truth he can find for it. That is his peculiar excellence, and he cannot stop short of it. When he finds, as he does, that the methods of proof he has mastered in laboratory and lecture room prove little outside his professional studies, he must not conclude that he can outlaw life. He must not fall into the world's habit of assuming that public policies or private morals are outside the domain of truth. He must believe, in spite of the world's example, that there is no field of thought or action where a man is not on his honour.

That word sums up all the duty of a university, and all that belongs to the world's peace. For, in war, men are only in danger of their lives, but in peace they are in danger of their honour. A scholar's sense of honour cannot be taught, but at a university it can begin to be learnt.

IV.

The university exists in a society which has its own values and assumptions. We have become much more conscious than we were of the importance of understanding those assumptions, of digging down into the unconscious of our society, to discover more of what is there. The ten years of Hitler's triumph, the energy of the totalitarian State, have shown us anew—and in our own time—the power of instinct embodying itself in an urgent creed.

During much of this century the universities have been spending their effort upon finding out more and more of the facts about the physical universe and in formulating, in the careful language of science, the laws that govern it. Much has been discovered by painstaking research about the world's past, both in historical time and the dim, vast ages beyond. We know far more than we did not merely about the lives of authors and artists but about the psychological processes by which their minds have worked. But comparatively little attention has been given to kinds of knowledge other than intellectual. What sort of knowledge does music give us ? With what sort of truth does religion deal ? What is the nature of culture, of conviction, of purpose, and from whence do

they spring ?

Science is concerned with putting forward true propositions about the world. But, of course, much truth is not to be expressed in the form of propositions at all. If the university is concerned with the finding of truth, then increasingly it must learn the promise of every avenue to it. Sometimes, perhaps, truth must simply happen to us if we are to receive it at all. There is a place for silence and for a waiting, expectant passiveness in the university. People even there need peace in which to grow. The university must stand for the enlargement and enlightenment of mind, for the discovery of many-dimensioned truth, not a truth which is flat only and therefore definable. We have certainly not thought enough about how to develop various kinds of responsiveness in our students or ourselves.

No man can live without some sort of faith and to-day the faith of the many is feeble and uncertain. I believe that we are called to live—and sometimes called even to teach—from very much nearer the centre of ourselves than we have habitually done. Much university teaching has necessarily to be from the circumference, but not all. I believe that the time is coming when there will be a greater awareness of the importance and meaning of the Christian insights than there is yet. To act with propriety is to act with perception of a situation in its wholeness ; the days may not be far off when the Christian in the university will be able to say things with propriety which in 1949 would seem to many within its precincts, improper, immature, even outrageous. Certainly the surer we are of ourselves and the deeper the level from which we live, the more we are able to bring others into touch with the springs within them.

One reason for the powerlessness of so much university effort is that so many of us have lacked strength of conviction that there is any ultimate meaning in things at all. The hunger for that conviction is one of the root causes of the present state of our world. It is the task of the Christian to let his own sure conviction of the ultimate unity of things be known and to help to light the university with a profounder comprehension of its own responsibility; a responsibility not only for adding to the store of discovered facts, but for concerning itself with sorts of truth other than factual ; a responsibility not only for extending the length, as it were, of knowledge but revealing its depth.

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THE WELFARE STATE

BY ELLIOTT DODDS

A LONG the path of social reform, all progressives have marched together. There have been acute differences on the question of State ownership ; this indeed has been the cause of cleavage between Liberals and Labour—Labour standing for the public ownership of all the means of production, distribution and exchange, Liberals holding that while any particular case should be judged on its merits all-round State ownership would mean the extinction of freedom—but on the “welfare” programme there has been no division. In the use of taxation to redistribute incomes, in the extension of social insurance, in the introduction of family allowances, in the establishment of the national health service, the Labour Government has been carrying on work begun by the Liberals. In some respects Labour may have gone further than the Liberals would have done ; it has certainly not been as careful as they would have been to insist on administrative economy, or to see that value was forthcoming for money. In principle, however, Liberals and Labour have been at one on the line which should be pursued—and the Conservatives (though with obvious qualms) have agreed also. At the present moment, indeed, they are taking great pains to assure the electorate that if they were returned to power they would maintain the social services in entirety.

How, then, has it come about that the new phrase, “the Welfare State”, is commonly used with a derogatory significance ? Whence have arisen the misgivings which are covertly entertained or openly expressed in so many quarters ? One reason, no doubt, is the tremendous and growing cost of the social services, concern at which is by no means confined to the wealthier classes, who make the greatest outcry. Socialist spokesmen have propagated the delusion that these services are provided gratis, but working-class folk are not fools and it has been coming home to them with growing force that they are paying for a large part of them out of their own pockets. The actual insurance contributions make a big hole in the wage-pocket, and added to these is the burden of taxation. So much of this taxation is indirect that the average working-class household has been slow to realize how heavy a toll is being levied upon it, but what with purchase-tax, punishing taxation on beer, tobacco, entertainments,

many working-class homes, where the wage-earner is also paying income-tax, must be paying out considerably more than they are receiving from the State, even when the food subsidies are included.

Is it right that the State should appropriate so large a proportion of the citizens' incomes and spend it on their behalf, instead of leaving them to spend it according to their own free choices ? To ask such a question is, of course, *lèse majesté* in totalitarian countries, where the State alone decides how "welfare" should be interpreted, and the citizens have to lump this interpretation or be liquidated. Such a view is rejected in this country, where totalitarianism is denounced by all parties, yet it is a reasonable inquiry whether, in the pursuit of "social justice", we are advancing, or have already advanced, too far along this road.

Allied with this question is the increase in the bureaucracy which has accompanied the extension of the social services. It was stated in January last that approximately one in twenty-nine of the working population were employed in Government service, and Lord Samuel has predicted that if things go on as they are now doing the eventual proportion will be one in ten. At the same time this inordinately swollen bureaucracy has been exalted above the law, and government by order has largely superseded government by Parliament. This development is also laid at the door of "the Welfare State", though it is not necessarily its concomitant.

Again it is objected that when the State does so much for the citizens (even though they have to find the money themselves) their independence is in danger of being sapped, and initiative and enterprise are being discouraged. In the old days, it is urged, men were spurred on by the fact that unless they worked hard and saved they would find themselves resourceless to meet the hazards of life. Now the State sees to it that although they may idle they and their dependents shall be cushioned against misfortune. Is there not a danger in this of our becoming a nation of "spivs" and scroungers, who will take all they can get without doing an honest day's work in return ? And if that happens how is the country to bear the cost of the social services, which have now come to be taken for granted ?

All these are questions which call for careful pondering, yet one cannot resist the suspicion that behind them there lurks a resentment against the whole process of greater equalization and a hankering to cast off the restraint of mutual responsibility. The situation clearly lends itself to exploitation, and there is real danger of an agitation being worked up that would set back the whole social reform movement. It would be a catastrophe if such a reaction took place. Not merely would class bitterness be raised to fever heat ; the door would be opened to Communism. The chief reason why Communism has made so little headway in this country is that social conditions have

been so greatly improved by parliamentary methods. In our present critical economic position it is no doubt necessary to call a halt. Sir Stafford Cripps has admitted as much. But to reverse the engines, to tell the workers that they have got to give up the gains which have been won after so much struggle, would be to play straight into the hands of the revolutionaries.

All the same, the problems raised by the growth of "the Welfare State" remain; and there is no evading them. Liberals especially are called upon to do some very hard thinking, for as pioneers in social progress they are also the traditional champions of sound finance and the independence of the individual. Has then the whole course which they—and Labour following them—have pursued been mistaken? Has it been wrong to invoke the powers of the State to promote greater equality? To levy toll on wealth in order to relieve poverty? To strive for social security? To establish all-in insurance? To institute family allowances? To set up a national health service? To seek to make a good education the birthright of every boy and girl? The answer must surely be that these things have been right and progressives must not allow themselves to be stampeded by apprehensions about the dangers of "the Welfare State" into allying themselves with the backward movement.

None the less there is substantial warrant for these apprehensions and they have got to be laid if the whole forward movement is not to be jeopardized. What, then, can be done? It must be acknowledged that the financial burden which the community is carrying at present is intolerable. There are only two ways of lightening it. One is to reduce the national expenditure, the other is to increase the national income. A great deal more than Ministers are willing to admit can be done under the first of these heads. It is impossible to say with any degree of accuracy what economies can be made until there has been an impartial and searching inquiry, but there can be no doubt that such an inquiry, followed by the wielding of an efficient "axe", would result in a cut of many millions. Besides such economies, the whole system of taxation needs overhauling and simplifying. In this connection the proposals for linking up the income tax system with social security which were originally put forward by Lady Rhys Williams and have since been adopted by the Liberal Party merit earnest attention. These proposals would eliminate many anomalies and inequalities. They would greatly simplify the P.A.Y.E. system, and remove its deterrent effect on increased effort. They would make possible a large reduction in the "horde" of civil servants and consequently in the Government's pay-roll, while the increased allowances suggested would mean a big cut in food subsidies. On balance taxation could be substantially reduced, while the money spent would go where it was really needed,

and the ordinary citizen would know much more accurately what he was paying.

This last point is crucial. What with direct taxation and its labyrinth of allowances, wide-ranging and heavy indirect taxation (including purchase-tax), insurance payments, benefits and subsidies, the present system is utterly bewildering, and even an expert mathematician cannot remotely tell what he is paying or how the balance between this and what he is receiving works out. This state of affairs needs remedying at the earliest possible moment. For the health of democracy it is vital to establish a system of taxation that will be honest as well as fair, so that the man in the street may know what the charges levied upon him really are and what he is receiving in return. This is the only way to kill the "something for nothing" idea which has done such immense harm; to create a proper sense of responsibility among the masses; and to ensure that public expenditure shall be kept under satisfactory public scrutiny.

And what about the other end of the stick—increasing the national income? It is obvious that a given level of taxation will be easier to carry in proportion as there is a larger total out of which to pay it. Eight shillings in 25s. 0d., for instance, would be appreciably more bearable than 8s. in the £. This is one very cogent reason for making every effort to increase production, for although a substantial cut in expenditure may be achieved the load must still remain crushing unless the back which carries it can be broadened. There are other reasons, however, with which we have become more familiar. It is a truism that unless production can be very substantially stepped up we shall either go bankrupt when Marshall Aid ends or have to submit to a drastic reduction in our standard of living. The Government, in its Economic Survey for 1949, set the target at two and a half per cent. This is merely a hope, for which the grounds are far from reliable, and even if it should be realized the increase will fall gravely short of our requirements. On the other hand, experts put our latent productivity at anything between ten and twenty-five per cent. If we could succeed in pulling out even the ten per cent. our problems would be solved. Why, then, are we failing to do so?

One cause lies in the tax system itself. Apart from the general deterrent effect of high taxation, the heavy tax that is still levied on undistributed profits which are ploughed back for capital equipment and the inadequacy of the depreciation allowances discourage expansion very seriously. Another cause lies in the controls which are at every turn hampering industrialists, who feel that they cannot move without getting the consent of some official or other. Meanwhile every extension of public ownership contracts the opportunities for private enterprise and increases the bureaucracy's grip on the economic life of the country, while the threat of further nationalization

keeps business in a state of paralysing uncertainty. In such circumstances is it to be wondered at that production lags ?

No-one in his senses would suggest that it is possible to make a clean sweep of controls, but many of them could be dispensed with if the " planning " mania had not got such a hold upon our rulers. Those especially which prevent competition and give a monopoly to already established firms should be swept away forthwith. At the same time a halt should be called to nationalization, at the very least until better proofs of the success of the already nationalized undertakings are forthcoming.

The most fundamental cause of the costiveness of production lies, however, in the psychology of the workers, who have no sense of " belonging ", and have been bred in the belief that if they exert their maximum effort the advantage will be reaped by the " boss " (or the shareholders). No doubt much delusion exists on this score. It is not so long since Sir Stafford Cripps pointed out that if corporation profits were reduced by a quarter this would only mean an addition of 4d. in the £ to wages and salaries. The fact remains that under the present system all the profits, when wages have been paid and provision has been made for reserves, are regarded as belonging by right to the shareholders, and this naturally galls the workers, who are also denied any voice in directing the enterprises on which their livelihood depends. Until this system has been changed—until the workers are given a share in the fortunes and direction of the undertakings in which they are engaged—their attitude will not be altered.

Recognition of the workers as partners would not only give a great stimulus to production ; it would also tend to eradicate class suspicion and jealousy and to promote the sense of responsibility, which is said to have been so gravely weakened by the growth of " the Welfare State ". Co-ownership, however, should be regarded as only one feature of a programme, designed to spread " the saving sense of proprietorship," while, in its turn, the diffusion of property is only part of the problem of distributing power and responsibility which so urgently confronts our modern society. In recent years (and especially under the present socialist administration) the tendency has been in precisely the opposite direction. More and more power has been sucked in to the centre, so that many of the smaller centres of responsibility have withered or already perished. Local authorities have been steadily denuded of their powers to become mere agents of Whitehall ; voluntary institutions, like the friendly societies, which have done so much to encourage thrift and independence among the people, are being put out of business, and the whole trend is to exalt " the omniscient State ". If the essential vitamins of democracy are to be preserved, this process must be reversed and " the principle of subsidiarity " vigorously pursued.

Two points raised earlier in this article remain to be considered in conclusion. First, is it proper that the State should take so large a part of the citizens' incomes and spend it on their behalf, instead of leaving them to spend it as they choose? The answer to this question will depend on the replies given to three others: (1) Is the *principle* of social insurance (using this phrase to cover the whole system under which all contribute and all are entitled to draw benefit) intrinsically *right*? (2) Has this system the free and intelligent approval of the citizens? (3) Is the actual proportion of their incomes which the State takes and spends for them compatible with their will and capacity to conduct their own lives as responsible *persons*?

The answer to the first of these questions has been given already. No-one—however little he may practise it in his relations with his fellows—will venture to challenge the principle of mutual responsibility. Yet—and here we come to the second point—the system which is based on this principle must not be imposed on the citizens by arbitrary authority. It must have their free and understanding approval, else it cannot be described as either moral or democratic. At first glance there seems as little room for doubt on this point as on the other. Although there may be disagreement about details, all parties support the system, which has the endorsement of the vast majority of the electors. As we have seen, however, large numbers of them have been taught to regard the benefits which they are receiving as free gifts, and although the hard facts are being brought home to them, the technique of taxation is so bewildering that they have no means of telling what they are actually paying. So long as this is the case they cannot be said to have given the system intelligent approval.

The third question—whether the actual proportion of the citizens' incomes which the State takes and spends for them is compatible with their self-direction—raises more difficulty, since it is one of degree, and opinions will naturally differ as to where exactly a halt should be called. The establishment of a "Plimsoll Line"—a social minimum—would be agreed to by nearly everyone; but it is certainly arguable that we have gone too far in subsidizing some sections of the people out of the others' pockets. Is it a fact, for instance, that security discourages enterprise and saps independence? That it does so is the underlying assumption of many of the objections to "the Welfare State". It must be granted that it is possible for the State to do so much for the citizens that (even though they help to pay the cost) they lose the inclination to do things for themselves. This is a real danger. On the other hand, may it not be contended that *insecurity* is a greater deterrent than security? How much "enterprise", for example, can be looked for from a bread-winner who is haunted by the fear of unemployment or does not know how

he is going to meet his doctor's bill or feed his children ? Some, of course, will go easy if the State makes it possible for them to do so, just as many who have enjoyed the much greater security of inherited wealth have been idlers and wasters ; but provided that the wage-earners know that increased effort on their part will bring greater reward, and provided also that no attempt is made to establish one dead level of equality and that there is full opportunity to progress by one's own efforts, the sense of security should stimulate, instead of discouraging, their will to better themselves.

They, however, and the rest of their fellow-citizens, must possess sufficient surplus over what the State takes from them to retain effective control over their own lives. Once more, therefore, we come back to the need for greater productivity, whereby alone the total wealth of the nation—and the share enjoyed by the individual citizen—can be increased ; and to the need for the more widespread distribution of property, which is the surest base of independence and of that power to choose which distinguishes the really free man. By such combined operations we can carry the cost of the social services without its breaking our backs ; match security with freedom ; and create a true welfare State, in which independence will flourish, while none is allowed to fall by the wayside and each recognizes his obligation to all.

GREECE : THREE YEARS OF CIVIL WAR

BY K. M. SMOGORZEWSKI

REVISITING Greece after an absence of two years, the foreign and friendly observer notices an improvement in the military situation, deterioration of the country's economic position, and a certain disillusionment caused by what the Greek political leaders consider insufficient recognition in the west of the sacrifices endured by the Greek people for the common cause of freedom.

What the Greek communists described as the "first round" in their fight for power in Greece started in March 1944 when they organized their first "government" in the mountains near Karpenision and tried to force its recognition as the provisional government of Greece. The "second round" began on December 3, 1944, when the Communists attempted to seize power. By July 1, 1947, the third communist rebellion was a year old, and out of an original force of 25,000 the rebels had lost over 8,000 men either killed or taken prisoner. They failed to conquer a single town but were in occupation of some twenty mountainous massifs. The strength of the Greek army was then only 100,000 men (seven divisions). Re-formed by the British Military Mission under Major-General S. B. Rawlins, with the idea of defending the country against a foreign invader, this army was not prepared for guerrilla warfare ; in particular it lacked commando troops, pack artillery, flat trajectory guns for use against machine-gun nests, and light fighter-bombers. It was not large enough to give protection to all the inhabited places of Greece but had to concentrate in larger towns and keep open communications, which meant that a considerable proportion of troops was committed to guard and convoy duties. Expansion was essential before any offensive could be taken against the "bandits" or *symmoritai* ; additional new weapons and a constant flow of munitions had also to be assured.

These were expenditures which the country could not afford. Though Great Britain was not, and could not be, disinterested, it was unable, owing to its own economic situation, to undertake any further help than the £60 million already spent on aid to Greece since the liberation. On February 21, 1947, the British Government informed the United States that by March 31 it would be obliged to end the financial assistance it had been giving to Greece. Promptly

the United States rose to the responsibilities of its new status as the greatest world power, and on March 12, 1947, the Truman Doctrine was proclaimed. On May 22 the U.S. Congress authorized an expenditure of £75 million on military and rehabilitation supplies for Greece. Headed by Lieutenant-General William C. Livesay, an American Military Mission arrived in Athens, and in the following month it was announced that the Greek army would be increased to 130,000. In November it was decided to form a joint U.S.-Greek general staff to direct military operations against the rebels and to attach U.S. officers in an advisory capacity to Greek operational units. Lieutenant-General Konstantinos Ventiris, chief of the Greek General Staff, was replaced by Lieutenant-General Demetrios Yantsis. In February 1948, General Livesay was succeeded by Lieutenant-General James A. Van Fleet, a tactician thus taking the place of an expert in "logistics", this time as commander of the Joint U.S. Military Advisory and Planning Group, Greece.*

In the meantime fighting continued in the mountains, and by April 9, 1948, the total *symmoritai* strength was estimated as 30,000, and their losses were believed to be 20,300. The military map of Greece still resembled a slice of *gruyère* cheese, each hole corresponding to a rebel pocket of unequal strength, and the largest holes being the Grammos and Vitsi massifs near the Albanian and Yugoslav frontiers. Generals Van Fleet and Yantsis considered it advisable to ignore the smallest enemy pockets and concentrate against Grammos, the suppression of which stronghold would, in fact, cut the main rebel communication line leading through the Pindus range into the heart of Greece. The offensive—started on June 16, 1948, with the elements of six Greek divisions against a rebel force of some 15,000—was successful and by the end of August General Van Fleet was saying that "the greatness of the Grammos victory cannot be over-emphasized."

However, the bulk of the rebel forces defeated in the Grammos operation, escaped into Albania and shortly afterwards returned into Greece, rallying in the nearby Vitsi. By January 1, 1949, their total losses amounted to 51,000, but they were still able to maintain a strength of around 25,000. They succeeded in reoccupying the northern part of the Grammos massif, increased their activity in central Greece, and even in the Peloponnese which, with the exception of a few towns, was completely dominated by rebels. As the

* In February 1948, Major-General Rawlins was succeeded as commander of the British Military Mission to Greece by Major-General E. E. Down. The British continue to train the Greek army, navy, air force and police. A British brigade remains in Greece with headquarters at Salonika. In the past year Great Britain supplied to Greece against payment a large amount of military stores, 74 Spitfires and 24 training and 12 transport aircraft. It also made the Greek forces a gift of surplus ssr toeof considerable value, including 22 Spitfires.

Greek people had been induced to believe—or wanted to believe—that total victory could be achieved in 1948, a state of general discouragement was noticeable throughout the country. Fortunately, the combined action of two sets of events brought about a remarkable recovery of both military situation and public spirits during the first half of the present year.

From the time of the Cominform announcement on June 28, 1948, of Marshal Tito's "heresy", the position of Markos Vafiadis, C.-in-C. of the rebel army and Prime Minister of the "Democratic" government in the mountains, was one of difficulty. His training camps, supply bases and hospitals were on Albanian, Yugoslav and Bulgarian soil, and now Tirana and Sofia had begun to fulminate against the Tito clique. It is unavoidable that among the Greek communists some should be Greek first and pro-Soviet second, and it is possible that Markos Vafiadis was inclined to accept Marshal Tito's solution of the Macedonian problem as the price of substantial Yugoslav help enabling him to direct an offensive towards Salonika. It is also probable that in the eyes of the Soviet advisers he had failed as a military commander. Whatever the reason, he was lured on to Bulgarian soil under the pretext of some staff talks, arrested there and sent to the Lubianka prison in Moscow.

His place as C.-in-C. was taken by Nikolaos Zachariadis, secretary-general of the K.K.E. (Communist Party of Greece), the new "Prime Minister" being Demetrios Partsalidis, former secretary-general of the E.A.M. (National Liberation Front). Nikolaos Zachariadis ordered mass attacks on the larger towns. He failed against Florina, but Naousa, Edesa and Karpenision were taken in the hope of supplies and recruits. Able to remain there only a few days, the rebels gave way to slaughter and savage destruction before retreating; in Naousa, for instance, they blew up a hospital and destroyed five textile factories. Such tactics were likely to have a damaging effect on the communist cause. More damaging, however, were the tactics of the K.K.E. leaders in the so-called Macedonian problem.

On March 27, 1949, the Communist Organization of Aegean Macedonia (K.O.E.M.) was founded at a congress in the Vitsi mountains. Zachariadis and Kaladziev, in the name of the Greek and Bulgarian Communist Parties, pledged support for an independent Macedonian people's republic. Such a manoeuvre is intelligible as part of the Kremlin offensive against Marshal Tito—who has four-fifths of the Macedonian people within his federal republic—but it could hardly help the K.K.E. in their fight against what they call Greek "Monarcho-Fascism". A Greek who accepts the wresting from his country of a province with an overwhelmingly Greek population cannot expect to be regarded as a Greek either in Athens or abroad. The creation of K.O.E.M., more than anything

else, is behind Marshal Tito's declaration at Pola, on July 10, that he "must gradually close the Yugoslav-Greek frontier." Thus, out of a "front" of some 600 miles, the central stretch of 200 miles becomes neutral. He did not act out of sympathy for Greece ; if he has had to postpone to the Greek Kalends his dream of securing Salonika by including all Macedonia in his federation, he is doing so for his own survival. But this new coupling undoubtedly helps the Greek cause.

Events at home led also to improvement of the military situation. Incredible as it may seem, for two and a half years Greece at war was not allowed to have a commander-in-chief. There were only a chief of the General Staff and three Army Corps commands* under the control of a coalition government and the U.S. advisers. King Paul and the army considered that this situation must be ended. Not without great difficulty an agreement was reached among the Greek political leaders, and on January 20, 1949, with the blessing of Washington and London, General Alexandros Papagos, the only full general of the Greek army, was appointed C.-in-C. When, in November 1948, he was asked to assume the command, he declared himself ready to serve, but stipulated that he must have the full confidence of the main Greek political parties, that he must be free from foreign interference, and that he must have 50,000 additional soldiers.

Of these three conditions the first two were accepted, but the third, which in fact is an appeal for more American aid, is still unfulfilled. General Van Fleet stated in Athens at the end of November : "Greece cannot afford a big army. The money needs to be spent for recovery. But Greece does need a highly efficient army. A better army rather than a larger one can be achieved in 1949 and such an army is certain to secure final victory." At the beginning of March 1949 Field Marshal Sir William Slim, Chief of the Imperial General Staff, and General Sir John Crocker, C.-in-C. Middle East Land Forces, conferred in Athens with General Papagos. It is believed that they advised an increase of the Greek army in numbers, but also insisted on better, that is, longer, training of the Greek infantry. In 1948 the Greek War Ministry reduced the basic training period from three months to six weeks because of the shortage of reserves.

General Papagos was lucky to assume command at the time when the Peloponnese operation under Lieutenant-General Tsakalotos was in full swing. An infantry division, with vehicles, and together with horses and mules, was transported in December by sea as part of the concentration of Greek forces against the 5,000 rebels under

* In August 1949 their commanders were : 1st Army Corps (Larissa), Lieutenant-General, Thrasyvoulos Tsakalotos ; 2nd (Kozani), Major-General Stylianos Manidakis ; 3rd (Salonika) Lieutenant-General Theodoros Grigoropoulos.

"General" Stephos Saraphis (alias Ghiouzelos). This operation ended in a speedy and complete victory which was helped by the fact that the rebels had no road mines at their disposal. With the Peloponnese cleared, General Papagos was able to concentrate in Thessaly and Roumeli against the rebel "divisions" operating under "General" Konstantinos Karaghiorghis, former editor of the Athens communist newspaper *Rizospastis* which was suspended in the autumn of 1947. As the Greek army controlled the two roads across the Pindus range—the old Kalabaka-Metsovo-Ioannina road and the new one, built during the summer of 1948, connecting Kozani via Pentalofon with Konitsa—Karaghiorghis was neither in a position to receive supplies and munitions from the north, nor to send a few thousand forced recruits to the training camp at Moschopolis, near Koritsa, in Albania.

By July 1, 1949, the total rebel losses during three years of fighting amounted to 76,000 (31,000 killed and 45,000 captured or surrendered) and their total fighting strength was estimated at 18,000, the lowest figure since July 1947.* The recruitment by force of young Greeks in occupied areas is diminishing because these areas are shrinking and the difficulties of communication along the Pindus range are increasing. If the Kremlin wishes to continue the rebellion it must replace the losses, and it has at its disposal only two small remaining sources ; there are perhaps 10,000 Bulgarian citizens of military age of Greek origin and there are a few thousand Tsams, or Albanian Moslems, from the Thesprotia district of Epirus, who after the 1939-1945 war emigrated voluntarily to Albania.

As soon as General Papagos was appointed C.-in-C. he ordered certain changes in the high command. Lieutenant-General Gheorghios Kosmas succeeded General Yantsis as chief of the General Staff, and Lieutenant-General Stylianos Kitrilakis took charge of operations. (The latter was similarly engaged during the Greco-Italian war of 1940-1941, when General Papagos was C.-in-C. and the Greek army entered Albania in pursuit of the invader.) General Ventiris was recalled to active service and in early July became head of a new command at Kozani covering Epirus and western Macedonia. The operation which started on August 7 against the Grammos-Vitsi massifs was obviously the outcome of his preparations.

Although from a military point of view the outlook begins to seem brighter, there are two major disintegrative elements in the Greek situation. In spite of the satisfactory progress of material reconstruction (ports, railways, roads, etc.), the economic and financial

* The Greek army suffered in these three years losses amounting to 11,000 killed, 24,000 wounded and 4,000 missing. The number of officers killed is more than 800, as opposed to 740 killed during the Albanian campaign of 1940-1941.

position of the country has greatly deteriorated during the past two years. In the 1946-1947 budget, actual revenue was Dr. 1,402,000 million against an expenditure of Dr. 2,200,000 million ; in the 1948-1949 budget the respective figures are estimated at Dr. 1,800,000 and 3,100,000 million. These enormous deficits were met from the American aid marked for reconstruction. The currency circulation in May 1947 amounted to Dr. 677,000 million ; two years later it was Dr. 1,225,000 million (£1=Dr. 32,500). By April 1949 the cost of living had increased 70 per cent. since basic wages were fixed in November 1947 and it is impossible not to applaud the patriotism of the Greek workers and employees who so far have spared the country from a wave of strikes. The U.S. economic advisers are against a general increase of wages in order not to encourage the inflationary pressure. What can be done? There are neither easy, nor straightforward solutions. The causes of the trouble being political, the remedies should be of the same character.

The Greek people are conscious that this war—although fought locally on Greek soil—is an international trial of force between the U.S.S.R. and the west in general and the U.S. in particular. They know that they are fighting not only for their own survival but also for democracy and the freedom of the world. They know too that their own exertions cannot end the struggle and this is another imponderable factor in the Greek situation. It saps the national morale, discourages those who are ardently patriotic, and encourages the cynic and the defeatist.

Even if at the end of this year—and this is an optimistic assumption—all rebels on Greek territory were to be completely wiped out, there remain in the north two neighbours whose frontiers cannot be sealed and whose territories will be used either for the continuation of the present “third round” or for the start of a “fourth round” later. One of these countries, Albania, is now completely isolated and internal conditions are known to be difficult. Why not therefore encourage there an anti-Kremlin liberation movement? The recent suggestion by certain Greeks of a partition of Albania between Greece and Yugoslavia was a foolish idea, unworthy of a nation conscious of its great past and confident of its future. On the other hand, it is still a declared policy of the Greek Government to claim the southern part of the present Albanian territory as far as the Koritsa-Valona line. As the Greek arguments are indeed weak, it is to be hoped that at the right time, in order to help any Albanian liberation movement, Greece will drop altogether this territorial claim. To seal the Albanian frontier, the most practical way is to have a peaceful and friendly Albania, and this can be achieved only by respecting its political independence and territorial integrity.

IRANIAN OIL CONCESSIONS—1

BY HANS HEYMANN

IF we seek a small scale model of the forces and ingredients participating in the great power struggle that is as old as the Dead Sea and yet ever-changing in its patterns, we have only to look at Iran. This unpretentious heir to the great Persian empire finds itself, to-day, in the no man's land of a world-wide duel on the periphery of two constellations of power. Iran, not a member of the Atlantic Pact nor included in the concept of the Truman Doctrine, possesses treasures that are of vital concern to both of the powerful contenders in the great duel. Iran's lot is not a happy one.

When Leon Trotsky, People's Commissar of Foreign Affairs of the new Republic of the Soviets, needed troops for the Red Army he was about to organize and wanted to evacuate all Russian troops from Iran, he presented a communiqué to the Iranian Minister in Petrograd, cancelling the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907. In the summer of 1918, N. R. Brovine, the Soviet diplomatic agent, submitted a note to the Iranian foreign office which started :

The weakness of the Persian government has been due generally to the fact that her rights and her national wealth have fallen into the hands of foreign imperialism and capitalism. The revolutionary nation of Russia, after having done away with these internally in Russia, is convinced that its dear brother—the neighbouring nation of Persia—should be free from the oppression of this same capitalism and would like to see Persia free herself from the clutches of foreign capitalism. Therefore, it is stated that the Ministry is hereafter at liberty to consider all former concessions which the late Russian régime obtained for itself in Persia, including mineral, fishing and transportation concessions (secured through the use of the bayonet or powerful men of Persia) as no longer under the protection of the Russian Republic. It is to be hoped that Persia will keep its interests for its own benefits and never deliver them into foreign hands.

The renounced rights were subsequently specified and confirmed by Chicherin, Foreign Minister of the Soviet Republic. They included the Caspian sea fisheries and free navigation of Iranian vessels under the Iranian flag on the Caspian sea. Soviet Russia had a very special reason, not well understood by the west, for insisting on a contract in the fisheries question in the Soviet-Iranian Treaty of 1921. The valuable caviar-producing sturgeon keeps strictly to the southern part of the Caspian sea. A concession granted to the Russian Stepan Lionosoff as early as 1876, had grown to a flourishing enterprise with fleets, nets, refrigeration, storing and port facilities.

reaching north to Astrakhan and worth millions of roubles. When the Iranian Government thought the Soviet renunciation of the 1918 fisheries concession was definite, it granted the concession to Hassan Kiadeh of the Soviet Department of Trade. The family Lionosoff, living in Teheran, protested. An arbitration court considered the Kiadeh concession illegal and prolonged the former Lionosoff concession for fifteen years under the condition that 50 per cent. of the profits reverted to the Iranian Government.

In the 1921 treaty the Soviet Republic, wanting to cover the rear of its growing Union, cancelled all concessions, debts and privileges of the Czarist era. The treaty further provided for diplomatic and consular representation and denounced all previous treaties made between the U.S.S.R. and Iran and between Russia and the other powers concerning Iran. The Russian Discount and Loan Bank was handed over to the Iranian Government and the Irano-Soviet Fisheries of the Caspian Sea were formed for altogether twenty-five years. Though in modified form, they are still in existence to-day. It was further agreed that the concessions granted to the Soviets should not be granted to a third power. Russia finally reserved the right for herself to "send troops into Iran" in case of a threat to Russia by any third power and, according to Annex 2 of the Treaty of December 12, 1921, the relevant Article was

intended to apply only to cases in which preparations have been made for a considerable armed attack upon Russia or the Soviet Republics allied to her by the partisans of the régime which has been overthrown or by its own supporters

The exact wording of the Article and the Annex was to be of special significance in 1948. When they were drafted in 1921 the R.S.F.S.R. was afraid that a third power might attempt to use the elements of the overthrown Czarist régime in a war of intervention. The reference was to the *Dinstorforce*, which in 1918 had armed General Baratov and the White Russians and transported them to Baku. To interpret this agreement as was done in March-April 1948 by the U.S.S.R. to mean that the presence of 46 U.S. officers assisting in training the Iranian Quartermaster Corps of the Iranian Army was a threat to the U.S.S.R. and justified invocation of the 1921 Treaty, seems a ridiculously far-fetched interpretation of that treaty.

Other treaties between the Soviets and Iran followed. After the Iranian decision to prolong the Lionosoff fisheries concession, the Soviet Government offered the organization of a fisheries corporation on an equal sharing basis with the Iranian Government in 1924, against which the American A. C. Millspaugh (Administrator General of Iranian Finances) protested. Soviet cheque payments were refused by him and a critical situation developed. The Soviets, in order to enforce the concession, now placed an embargo on all Iranian exports to Russia, despite all the hardship and losses for Iranian

commerce resulting therefrom.

It was only after the resignation of Dr. Millspaugh as a result of differences over his authority that the concession was granted to the Soviet Union in 1927 on Soviet terms of a jointly-owned corporation. It was agreed that 80,000 tomans should be paid to the Government of Iran as a rent and that profits should be halved between the two stockholders. Iran has never been very happy with this agreement ; as the sturgeon is sold to the U.S.S.R. at prices determined in Russia, profits over costs and overhead have been negligible if any, to the dissatisfaction of the people of Iran.

After the death of Lenin a struggle within the Communist Party of the U.S.S.R. had been raging that first led to the rise of Trotsky's opposition in 1926 and to the victory of the Stalinists, with the consequent exile of Trotsky and removal of Zinoviev. The repercussions on world Communism of this revolutionary change were serious. As a result of the Sixth Comintern Congress the Communist International had lost its independence and individual cells in foreign countries had become satellites of the Communist Party of the U.S.S.R., to be used in the future for furthering the foreign policy of the Soviet Union. There can be no doubt that it supported and directed the communist cells in other countries for unforeseen events, but with the aim of preventing war by diplomatic means. As there is some doubt about the intention of the initiators of the resolutions of the Sixth Comintern of 1928, the appeals of Rykov and Litvinov for disarmament and peace should be studied.*

But the American interpretation sometimes differs and usually runs along these lines : 'Reference to the Resolution of the Sixth Comintern shows that revolutionary activity was to *culminate in annexation* to the Soviet Union. This is repeated several times in the context. Inasmuch as communist action in colonial areas was to annex all their territories in the final stage—can this be called defensive ? Thus the peace talk of Litvinov and Rykov must be contrasted with the goal of annexation of all colonial territories by revolutionary means. The latter is 'limited war.' The simultaneous peace talk of the Soviet Narkomindel thus appears as camouflage to distract other States while revolution was prepared internally.'

Despite the dissolution of the Comintern in 1944 after an unofficial request by President Roosevelt, it remains difficult to separate Soviet-directed from independent actions of communist parties in individual countries. Nor is it possible correctly to evaluate the degree of direction, assistance, or suasion coming from Moscow as contrasted with the inspiration and guidance national communist party leaders themselves seek and demand from Moscow. Be this as it may,

*See *We can do business with Russia*, pp. 64-68, by Hans Heymann.

there is certainly a high degree of *esprit de corps*, to put it mildly, prevailing between Moscow and those quarters.

In 1925 the Qajar dynasty of Iran was overthrown and in 1926 Riza Khan made himself Shah-in-Shah and the crown of Darius was made hereditary in his family. During Riza Khan Pahlevi's reign Iran once more strengthened her international position through various treaties ratified with foreign powers. The "capitulations" that had been arranged formerly were abolished in 1927-1928 and the concessions granting France the monopoly for excavations were cancelled. Frontier disputes between Iran and Afghanistan, Iraq and Turkey were settled and the frontier river, Shatt-al-Arab, put under joint administration with Iraq.

The reforms of State finances which the American Mission under Dr. A. C. Millspaugh had initiated between 1922 and 1927 turned out to be of great success and led to a vast programme of industrialization, adopted by the Government in 1932 which started large State-owned enterprises. In its over-all dimensions this programme involved a capital outlay of approximately \$250,000,000. The construction of the Trans-Iranian Railway running from the Caspian to the Persian Gulf was completed at a cost of \$125,000,000 in 1938. It was a great engineering accomplishment, destined to be of special strategic significance in the 1939-1945 war. More and more western European culture and techniques were imported in a truly revolutionary westernization.

When the war began, Iran decided to declare her neutrality. In British and Soviet literature on Iran since 1941 we find among the motives for Anglo-Russian invasion the fact that German agents (numbering "some three thousand") swamped the country and agitated to an alarming degree. But as a reason for British and Russian action, this was merely propaganda. Other facts behind the attack have been disclosed by American writers. As Edwin M. Wright stated (in "Iran as Gateway to Russia," *Foreign Affairs*) :

The alleged reason for the Russian and British invasion of Iran was the refusal of the Iranian Government to expel an unknown number of Germans who, it was feared, were paving the way for a German *coup d'état*. A second purpose, stressed in the press and alluded to by Winston Churchill in his speech of September 9, 1941, was to open the road for a transport of war supplies to Soviet Russia. Back of both reasons was doubtless the British desire to strengthen the defence of India against eventual German attack.

As to the exact number of German agents, probably no more than a thousand were involved, though a considerable part of them held important industrial and technical positions. Probably the desire to intern German agents was in the main for the purpose of counter-acting the strong pro-German feeling that prevailed at the court of Riza Shah Pahlevi and among many leading Iranians. The situation can be compared with that of Iraq, where the pro-British Government

was overthrown by the pro-German politician, Rashid Ali al Gailani, thereby forcing the British to undertake a counterstroke.

The main hope of the invading powers was certainly the opportunity of using the Iranian communication and transportation system for expansion into another "Burma Road" by which the much needed war supplies could be transported to Russia as compensation for the heavy losses in war material in their hasty retreat under Nazi attack. Eventually over 5,000,000 tons of lend-lease reached the Soviet Union *via* the Persian Gulf route.

Mr. Wright further explains in his article the alternative routes that the invading powers had to face in this difficult task. History will not easily forget the almost superhuman efforts of American engineers and servicemen to expand and complete the road from the Persian Gulf to the U.S.S.R. in the shortest possible time. It carried American lend-lease material to the Soviets and helped them in their own heroic efforts to win the war. As a highly important though less obvious reason, he points to "the British desire to secure India against invasion." More was at stake :

... For to the south hidden behind equally lofty and still more concentrated mountain areas, lie the rich Iranian oil fields, the life source of the whole British defence system in the east. These wells produce about 10,200,000 tons* of oil a year— twice the amount of the Iraq fields and thrice that of Rumania. The mountains of Iranian Azerbaijan control all the routes from the Caucasus that German (or Soviet) troops might take to reach the oil fields or to penetrate into India across northern Iran and Baluchistan via Quetta

So, in August 1941, after the Nazi invasion of the Soviet Union, British and Soviet troops invaded Iran. The Soviet Union allegedly had considered herself "threatened at her Iranian flank and, according to the Iran-Soviet Treaty, marched into Iran to remove this threat." (See Annex 2 of 1921 Treaty.) On September 20, 1941, after a few days of fighting, the country was placed under joint Russian and British control. The Shah abdicated in favour of his son Mohammed Riza Pahlevi.

In the Tripartite Treaty of January 29, 1942, an alliance between Iran, Britain and Russia was instituted that was supposed to remain in force indefinitely, but was soon to be violated. Its main objective was the safe delivery of ample war provisions and American lend-lease help to Russia. Moreover the Allies promised to respect Iran's territorial integrity and political independence, and to grant the country economic assistance during and after the war.

Article 5, one of the main parts of the Tripartite Treaty, reads as follows : "The forces of the Allied Powers shall be withdrawn from Iranian territory not later than six months after all hostilities have been suspended by an armistice." American troops and engin-

* Production in 1948 was almost 25 million tons.

eers greatly expanded and improved highways and railroads, and an inflationary war boom developed which was partially forced by heavy Allied spending, cessation of almost all imports, and illegal exportation of foodstuffs to the U.S.S.R. from the Soviet occupied zone. All this was worsened by general corruption and bad crops within the country. Iran became "the Asiatic bridge of victory" and in 1943 Teheran became the historic place of a conference symbolic of the victory of the Big Three—Roosevelt, Churchill and Stalin.

Iran declared war on Germany in 1943 and on Japan in 1945. The United States withdrew her troops before January 1, 1946, and the United Kingdom withdrew as stipulated by Treaty on March 1, 1946. The U.S.S.R., however, kept her forces in Iran until May 11, 1946, in violation of the Treaty, probably for the purpose of backing up her bargaining power in her current negotiations for oil concessions.

(The second half of this article, discussing the Russian, American and British negotiations behind the Iranian Incident, will be published in the next issue of The Fortnightly. The author writes from the University of Illinois where he is Visiting Professor of Economics. His book, OIL AND TURMOIL IN THE MIDDLE EAST, is due for publication early in 1950.)

THE ROYAL MILITARY CANAL

BY PATRIC DICKINSON

I.

In agony of mind, in the west country,
Safe in a beautiful green solitude,
Coleridge sweated imagining invasion.

That is where they will land,
Said the general imagining invasion ;—

In Dymchurch Bay, Rye Bay, all along there.
This is what you must do.

I must write a poem. I must make them feel
Somehow the horror, the wounds, the bloody shambles,
I must break this inhuman indifference to suffering.

What must we do ?

You must cut a defensive canal
From Hythe to the River Rother :
It is no use telling me it cannot be done.

Where are the words, where are the spades ?
Hundreds of sweating men, week after week :
This is where they will land.

What am I to say ?

Report the canal is finished,
The north bank built as a rampart,
The length some fifteen miles.

Where are the words ?

A pity that invasion came to nothing,
We were never able to test the canal in action.
Better plant trees in the north bank to bind it.

II.

One hundred and forty years of falling leaves,
From the first thin autumn each year recruiting number,
Weeping, falling, brief and expendable,
And we indifferent to them, as to soldiers,
Layer upon layer into the soft canal,
And the trunks swelling with slow Victorian Empire.

III.

Come here : Do you see the notice ?
This is officially beautiful, to be preserved
By the National Trust. The Royal Military Canal.
Cut out of terror and urgency, a defensive measure,
Hurriedly hundreds of sweating men for weeks—

And now it is beautiful, Yes, truly, it is so.
 Along the grass-covered rampart blackberries grow
 Under the elms, and Marbled White butterflies
 In their short season flicker over the blossoms
 Casting their eggs on the wing—a strange miracle
 To ponder, as Coleridge would, now as we walk along
 Gathering flowering reeds with their lush muddy smell.

IV.

Some of the trees are dead.
 Like huge cast antlers, grey and inert and naked,
 They pray dead prayers to the contemporary sun
 Under whose light we move in living terror.
 They will all die soon.

V.

Sit here, my darling, under this old dead tree,
 This is where they will land.
 There is nothing to stop them but this narrow canal,
 So beautiful this evening in old age.

Will, in a hundred years, our fearful preparations
 Anywhere in this world be beautiful,
 And innocent, a natural solitude
 In which to plant our fears ?—if they might grow
 New trees along these banks ! Tonight I fear
 More for the flowering reeds, the Marbled Whites,
 And the Kingfisher we expect each minute,
 Than for ourselves.

I fear for all nature under the threat of man
 Running the dust-bowl through his nickel fingers :—
 Even in direst fear not planting even the grain
 That will bind his children's flesh together
 To their soft pliant bones.

O I feel more lost beside this old canal,
 More desperate for man's indifference,
 Than ever Coleridge : and what is there to do ?

Where are the words, where are the spades ?
 This is where they will land.

NEW TRENDS IN GERMAN LITERATURE

BY D. L. HOBMAN

IT is told of Till Eulenspiegel that he had a habit of weeping whenever he went downhill because he knew that a steep ascent awaited him next time ; but when he climbed laboriously uphill he would laugh with delight at the thought of the easy descent to come. The story is symbolic of the whole trend of modern German writing whose *leitmotif* is hope.

The German people require " a great impulse of will, and that can only lie in a great hope," says Alfred Weber in *Abschied von der bisherigen Geschichte*. The title of this book is misleading, as in fact it is not a leavetaking from history, which would be impossible, but it surveys past stages of development and suggests a new course to be followed. The author believes that we have reached the end of the period of free rivalry between national States, which must be replaced by purely cultural ones built up on a kind of syndicalist economy with planned security. A synthesis is to be created between the *élite* and the mass, a new average humanity (*Durchschnittsmenschheit*) to be developed by new educational methods. It is essentially a German task to change the German from " a patient obedient mass animal " into an independent and self-conscious individual, jealously aware of his liberty ; references to the once discredited liberal point of view are noteworthy. There is nothing very profound or original about all this, but the book contains interesting studies of some of the great men who are milestones on the road of our civilization, especially of the transcendental power of Shakespeare. The author attacks Hegel's theory of the State, and devotes a long section to Nietzsche ; he admits that Nietzsche flagellated *bourgeois* shallowness, which flourished in Germany unchecked by an intellectual *Bohème* as in France, or by the ideal of a gentleman, lingering on from the age of chivalry as in England. Nevertheless, he considers that Nietzsche helped to bring about the catastrophe of our times by his betrayal of " the psycho-spiritual forces which the west had newly discovered, the forces of active humanity combined with liberty." He appears to defend the point of view that a European equilibrium might have been maintained if his countrymen had not felt themselves unsatisfied in their imperialist demands (*imperial sich für ungesättigt haltend*), but he accepts

German responsibility for the war.

This sense of guilt led to a wish among a section of Germans that they might be beaten by the enemy. "Could I have thought it possible as a child, that a man impelled by duty and love of God might desire and welcome the temporal defeat of his own People?" asks Theodor Haecker in his diary. And again: "All our victories are gained 'according to plan' . . . Suppose that they were part of an altogether different plan by another Being . . . the plan of our defeat?" Incidentally, defeat would at least break the hegemony of Prussia, which has taken away the German heart of flesh and substituted a heart of iron and paper, of action and of phrase. The *Tag-und Nachtbücher* were written secretly during the war by a man in constant danger from the Gestapo. His home was destroyed by an air raid in 1944 and he died the following year. His writings include translations from Kierkegaard, Cardinal Newman and Francis Thompson, and his diary reveals an impassioned Christianity, although he does not fail to rebuke cowardice among Catholics and Protestants alike. He abhorred the lack of solitude under a mass régime, feeling his very soul corroded by nausea, especially under the impact of the raucous shouting of the leaders. "The news and the voices! Oh Lord God, hear! The voices and the news! Hear and avenge mankind and the Germans who still pray to you!" This horror of the voices on the radio, harsh and strident or fat and self-satisfied, occurs in many German books, as well as wartime interest in the B.B.C. Theodor Haecker blames Houston Chamberlain, to a less extent Wagner, and—like Alfred Weber—especially Nietzsche for the corruption of the German people. Nietzsche was apparently compared to Kierkegaard in some quarters, but Theodor Haecker considers this ridiculous because one of them prayed and the other did not.

Christian resignation is the keynote of *Macht und Gnade* (*Power and Mercy*), a collection of essays by Reinhold Schneider. Suffering must be accepted, there can be no Christianity without an understanding of the meaning of disease and if man loses his faith he also loses himself, for unless he has established a relationship with heaven, he can never establish it with earth. He considers that in England, after the breach with Rome, religious life did not again develop until the Quakers, turning away from worldly power, learned to seek for the inner light.

This kind of subdued optimism finds more definite expression in German fiction, which is either documentary or fantastic. This word is not used in any derogatory sense; German stories are actually fantasies, as though their authors did not feel themselves able to grapple with reality, or it may be that their reality has indeed become so fantastic that it cannot be interpreted save through

symbols. An analysis of one of the most widely read and powerful of such novels, *Die Stadt hinter dem Strom* by Hermann Kasack, may serve as an example of this kind of work. A road leads from Lilliput, winding possibly through wonderland and certainly in and out of Kafka's labyrinthine courtyards, into this city beyond the stream. The author in bitter compassion has drawn a place of phantoms where our own age is distorted into a nightmare world, and the unreal lies "like a shimmering patina over people and things," yet scarcely more amazing than the actual German scene. Robert, the hero, is sent to take up a post in the city which turns out to be a habitation of the dead. The chief prefect issues orders by radio, but when Robert tries to reach this ultimate authority by telephone he cannot get any connection and when, in a frenzy of despair he smashes the loudspeaker, the sound of uncanny laughter is his only reply. After he has been shown all that there is to see he is sent back to his own country, which meanwhile has become a scene of destruction swarming with beggars and refugees. He wants to give the world a new kind of philosophy; one of the first persons whom he meets on his return, a woman journalist demanding an interview, assures him that his ideas are typical of prisoner-of-war psychology, but he perseveres and becomes an itinerant preacher for the rest of his life.

The story ends with his death and return to the city which he was once allowed to leave. During his first visit Robert wanders through places of "stone wounds" where the remaining rooms are crammed with odd pieces of stored furniture and broken litter. No music is ever heard in the town but his meals are served to a goosestepped rhythm. Endless forms have to be filled in, and the market-place is like a madhouse with its frantic bargaining and useless exchange of worn-out goods. In the square crowds stroll round and round the fountain, and Robert walking among them overhears fragments of conversation: "Not to-day but perhaps tomorrow . . . I always used cocoa-butter for baking . . . After cabbage-soup cyanide or gas . . . One only had to lift up one's skirt . . . I never belonged to the Party . . . Even Caesar is said to have been a Jew . . . The individual doesn't matter any longer . . . Not to-day but perhaps tomorrow." There are demagogues in cages, compelled to listen to gramophone records of their own speeches while poisonous saliva drips from the horn. The town has two enormous factories, one for ever producing stones out of rubble, the other for ever pulverizing the completed stones back into dust. The president of this unending system of industry is a kind of living mummy, worshipped by kneeling devotees with incense and bells. A troop of children passing through the childless city might have been evoked by the Pied Piper; women gaze after them rocking to and fro,

but their arms are empty, nor does the linen which some of them for ever busily sort and mend in fact exist : the women can do no other than mime normal actions. A young woman whom Robert loved on the other side of the river, and still loves on this side, is suddenly and unaccountably transformed like the maiden in *The Magic Flute* into a mumbling ancient crone. She is turned into one of three Sibylline sisters once known as Hope, Love and Faith, but now called Sorrow, Patience and Care.

The book vibrates with echoes from German literature and legend, and is infused with a queer mixture of mystic yearning and fatalism, an essentially German *Weltanschauung*. Free will is an illusion ; mass slaughter may have been necessary in order that new seed could be sown for the reincarnation of men. There is Teutonic nostalgia for the ancient wisdom of the east, together with a Spenglerian lack of faith in the west : Europe is no more than a truant child of mother Asia, and the events of the twentieth century are sufficient proof of the liquidation of western ideas. Hermann Kasack does not spare his fellow-countrymen. An artist whom he meets in the city of the dead tells him that he was destroyed by the madness of those Germans "who are their own enemy." A torturer admits his guilt, but adds : "From childhood onwards we were beaten if we were insolent and rebellious, and now that we are ourselves grown men we avenge the blows which we received, the stifling air, the choking atmosphere of our bringing-up. We have cut away the freedom of others because our own wings were clipped." Anybody who knows Germany cannot but understand this outburst : often he must have heard parents shouting in anger at their children in the public squares, often have seen the unimportant citizen, the little man, nervously cringing before some blustering official. There was always an underlying brutality in German life which inspired fear—of the bureaucrat, of the officer, of the father, of authority in any guise. The bully himself is afraid, especially of showing weakness ; as one of them says in this book : "Weakness calls out ill-treatment."

The western world was confounded by the backwash of medieval cruelty with which Europe was recently flooded by the Germans. It seems as though they fall more readily than other educated nations under the spell of the uncanny and gruesome. This word itself is derived from the German *grausam* meaning cruel, and there is undoubtedly a secret inner connection between a gloating love of the macabre and a sexual pleasure in the infliction of pain. German children are accustomed to Grimm's fairy-tales and to such stories as the collection of sadistic cautionary rhymes which make up *Shock-headed Peter*, without the spirit of comedy which in the English nursery helps to make the ogre less a figure of horror than of fun. The German muse appears to have dwelt in some haunted castle

looking out over a yawning graveyard to gloomy forests beyond, while witches went flying past on their broomsticks to keep an unholy tryst in the Walpurgis night, and Mephistopheles was never far away. The greatest of all German poets showed profound insight when he chose as his theme the story of a man selling his soul to the devil ; but Goethe allowed Faust to be redeemed in the end, and Hermann Kasack likewise, although he has presented a nightmare in which all sense of direction appears to be lost, does not give way to despair.

His symbolic method has been used in England by Rex Warner and more recently by Nigel Balchin in *Lord, I was Afraid*, with the same kind of technique—loud-speaker orations, worship of a colossal brass idol, overheard fragments of conversation, and so on. Yet in the last analysis it is the Englishman who is the more pessimistic of the two. According to Nigel Balchin the waters are rising, man has been cheated, and at the end he returns unused the talent which God gave him : “ For what it’s worth.” But in the German allegory, Robert, meeting his dead mother, thanks her for having borne him. Hermann Kasack believes that each individual does somehow contribute to “ the cosmic order of the world,” and if the phrase, like much of the philosophy, is nebulous and the pacifism unrealistic, there does yet remain a deep faith in the ultimate value of life itself.

Der Grosstyrann und das Gericht by Werner Bergengruen is a parable on a much slighter scale. The scene is an unspecified Italian city in an unspecified age, where the people become spiritually infected by the poison of false rumour. The contagion of evil spreads until a simple man, moved by love of his kind, in Christ-like humility takes upon himself the guilt of all, and the story closes in a general confession of sin and belief in forgiveness, although not without a final flicker of German arrogance by the deliberate exclusion of one citizen from the last masochistic scene. The same mystique of suffering is expressed in his volume of poems, *Dies Irae* :

You built the temple of the Anti-God,
And with your bricks our prison-walls you raised.
A thousand fires you kindled all around —
Now fires burn ! And cleanse us in your flame.

Elizabeth Langgässers long novel, *Das unauslöschliche Siegel*, is a heavy fantasy, occasionally whipped up into erotic foam, where everything is unsubstantial and everybody liable to change his shape as in a surrealist painting ; there is—perhaps fortunately—nothing quite like this in England, although at times one is reminded faintly of the style of J. C. Powys in *The Glastonbury Romance*. The seal of the title which can never be obliterated is the seal of Christ, a Catholic seal, for Protestantism, like Prussia, must be defeated, and lengthy accounts of Thérèse of Lisieux and Bernadette of Lourdes are interpolated in the story. One of the characters, a traveller in wine,

may serve to illustrate the method of the author : Monsier Tricheur—the very names are symbolic—is a snake-like incarnation of evil, who grovels in the dust and admits that he has never found it difficult to enter a garden. The action takes place partly in a small Rhineland town and partly in France, a country which is obviously dear to her heart.

The general interest in France seems to be based on a mixture of admiration and envy of French *savoir-vivre*. Some of the documentary fiction has a French background, like the short stories *Lucie und der Angler von Paris* by Friedrich Wolf, who was interned in a camp near the Pyrenees with many members of the international brigade from Spain. There is also a tale of Paris under the occupation by Anna Seghers in the collection *Der Ausflug der toten Mädchen*. Her style is straightforward and unpretentious ; one of her characters is a former Nazi guard from a death camp, who roams about the country unrepentant but afraid, always afraid—of his workmates, of his fellow-citizens, of everyone—a hunted, haunted man ; and in the title-story, “Picnic of Dead Girls”, the separate destinies of a group of her schoolfriends who picnicked together long ago are woven into the fate of the entire nation with touching effect.

These authors do not condone German guilt nor do they minimize German cruelty, but they also remind that always there were some who did resist, and that to belong to an underground movement within the *Reich* itself required high courage. Sabotage took place occasionally inside the factories, anti-Nazi leaflets were distributed, and—most dangerous of all—there were men who tried to rouse their compatriots by means of secret broadcasting, like the hero of the play *Die Illegalen* by Günther Weisenborn, an author imprisoned in 1942 for his illegal activities.

The most important piece of documentary work is Theodor Plievier's *Stalingrad*, a long account of the German defeat in Russia. It is a picture of hell, not of a burning place of everlasting fire but of a hell of ice, where a frozen foot peels off like a glove with the boot, leaving a skeleton leg on the living, where the fortunate dead lie piled in the cellars of Stalingrad among the wretched dying, where starvation and disease, madness and suicide help to complete the conquest. Two noteworthy facts emerge from this colossal record of disintegration : first, the myth of German super-organization is destroyed. Under the circumstances one might have expected a breakdown of the provision of food and munitions and medical supplies, but not the immense scale of the collapse, the panic and the chaos. And how explain why aeroplanes came out from home without enough petrol, or why no heating was provided in the slow scarce goods-trains sent to fetch the wounded, so that frozen corpses

were continually being thrown out, making room for more half-living freight? Secondly, there is no pretence that the army was unwilling to follow Hitler. Shortly before the capitulation when the generals realized that there had never been any need to defend Germany on the Volga, when at last they understood something of where their *Führer* had led them and of what he had done, they knew that they themselves had never protested against the conflagration as long as they had believed that they could cook their own soup in its glow. The author was at one time a German naval officer and has written several novels, one after 1918 with the significant title *The Emperor Went, The Generals Remained*. His new book, *Stalingrad*, can hardly be called a novel; it is an accumulation of horror which does not so much move to pity as bludgeon into a kind of sick stupor. Yet through it all there is still an affirmation of faith in life: "Germany does not need examples of dying but of living, of doing the proper thing at a given moment, if circumstances demand it, even contrary to orders." At the end the note of hope threatens to become sentimental, when a general and a private who is under detention wander away towards the future side by side, in what appears to an English reader as a somewhat unlikely comradeship.

A footnote states that Theodor Plievier lived in Russia during the war, and it must not be forgotten that German books to-day can only appear under the licence of one or other of the occupying powers, so that there is always the chance of an element of propitiation. It is not surprising, therefore, if catchwords like 'democracy' do not ring altogether true, and if the authors sometimes behave like the little boy who put in his thumb, pulled out a plum and then pointed out the excellence of his own behaviour. Nevertheless, it is not their sincerity which is in doubt so much as their gift for seeing life whole. They cannot attain true perspective while they are still in the immediate shadow of the past and under foreign rule, and it is too early even to guess in what direction German literature will be developed by her *Dichter*—the German word not for poets only but for all writers—when they are free once more. Will there arise among them another sage like Goethe, or a dramatist who loves liberty as Schiller did? A faun with Heine's gifts of melody and wit is unlikely to reappear.

THE BAEDEKER FIRMAMENT

BY ARNOLD PALMER

BIT by bit, the war goes on ending. Our own Muirhead has already exercised his muscles on an abridged *London*, and comes news from Hamburg that Baedeker is stirring again. No doubt years will pass before we have to steel ourselves to throwing out those old volumes at which we have gazed, with conflicting emotions and from time to time, during the last imprisoned decade. They are old friends who, in happy days, shared our holidays, and later consoled us by their very presence, battered, grimy, rubicund. It is painful to think how many of them are, even more than their owners, out of date ; and except by hearsay we don't know which of them are completely, considerably, or hardly at all unreliable. There is *Portugal*, but it is linked with *Spain* ; there is *Sweden*, but it is in the same volume as *Norway*. My *Switzerland*, published in 1928, is doubtless worth keeping, but as for my *Berlin & Environs* (1912)—well, what offers ?

Meanwhile, a new generation has arisen, for whom foreign travel means a mad rush to Switzerland and a totting up of budgets every night and morning, with no space between the horns of the dilemma of having too little money for the hotel and too much for the Customs. It is also apt to mean no Baedeker. Yet the guide-book habit, far from dying, has been nourished at home by a remarkable crop of volumes on the counties, the architecture, the churches, the coast, the inland, the roads and rivers of Britain. Some of them have a mushroom appearance, but others (like Murray's new series, the Betjeman-Piper architectural guides) are wholly admirable and must on no account be allowed to lapse. First rate or third rate these books, however, do not aim at replacing the Baedeker or Muirhead guides to Great Britain or even to London. Those packed and solid tomes are something apart. Their revival offers a chance to examine their past and estimate their future performance.

The great guide-books are wonderful compilations. When one reflects upon the ground they cover, it is astonishing how few are their omissions, how very seldom they are guilty of a downright mistake. During the last three or four years I have had to do much reading in topographical volumes, in town and county histories, in brochures on small villages and comprehensive surveys of wide areas.

The evidence, the facts, and especially the dates given by reputable authorities have often disagreed, and it is precisely on these occasions that my admiration for the standard guide-books has touched its zenith. If the point in dispute happens to be dealt with by Muirhead or Baedeker, I have found that the version there given is always the authentic one or, in its absence, the best supported and likeliest, and I am glad to take this opportunity of paying what is, as I have constantly proved to myself, a thoroughly deserved tribute to almost complete, and sometimes hardly attainable, reliability.

Such faults as they have are of a different order and, being matters of opinion, will not be considered as faults by everyone; the errors, if they are errors, are not theirs only but are due in part to the world's habit of moving even while the shutter clicks.

If we read a guide-book written a century or two ago, a book like Defoe's *Tour Thro' The Whole Island of Great Britain*, we cannot help being surprised by his point of view as often as by his England. What he didn't see, although it was staring him in the face, is at times unbelievable; the importance of his book depends frequently no less on what did not interest him as on what did. But what, in an author of 1725, is healthy and refreshing we find stale and stuffy in a book dated two hundred years later. Our aunts' dresses are not, in our eyes, as charming as our great-aunts'. Guide-books, which take a long time to reach the age of 200, are twenty years old before one can turn round, and tend inevitably to become a little old-fashioned in matters of taste. Architecture is such a matter. Since 1927, when the last Baedeker's *Great Britain* was published and Muirhead's *Blue Guide to London* was still in its first edition, there has been a great awakening in the public interest in architecture, and many changes in the directions in which we extend our admiration. Even twenty years ago these publications could be accused of being nearer in sentiment and taste to the *Dictionary of London* edited by Charles Dickens junr. than to the doubting, questioning world between the wars.

Turning to the principal post-war volume, the new abridged edition of the *Blue Guide to London*, we find that Lethaby's introductory essay to metropolitan architecture has been dropped, no doubt because of shortage of paper. It was an admirable survey, its disappearance is highly regrettable, but its position as well as its virtues placed it outside the scope of my comments, which are directed at the main body of the text, at what the ordinary reader reads. The index of the new edition certainly reveals changes and corrections in the architectural bias, but they are neither expected nor satisfactory. If the editor can no longer be accused of holding the Victorian view of the Victorian architects, it is merely because he has pushed all architects into the background and presented a London built by

no one. There are many artists in his index, from Edwin Abbey to Derwent Wood, but the London whose story he tabulates apparently owes nothing, nothing at all, to Burlington, Burton, Chambers, Cubitt, Gibbs, Hawksmoor, Holland, Kent, Nash, Smirke or Wilkins.

True, the index is unreliable ; a few of these men are, in fact, referred to in the text. But in both aspects, where it is trustworthy and where it is untrustworthy, the index surely reveals a queer and a false estimate of the tastes and interest of the modern public. The torrent of books about architecture, Tudor, Jacobean, Georgian, which pours from the presses in ever-swelling flow seems to confirm my belief and to contradict the ideas of the compiler of the guide-book. The extraordinary spate of these books is perhaps the outstanding feature of contemporary publishing. They are not produced for fun or for entirely disinterested ideals ; they are not remaindered ; they are bought and read by a large and insatiable public.

For the moment we will leave the architects in favour of more general, and to some people congenial, points of view. Re-editing a guide-book to a damaged city cannot be easy, especially when plans for restoration or reparation are still undetermined. Nevertheless, where much is nebulous, the visitor, the reader, remains sturdily himself, and it should be possible to anticipate his wants and wishes rather more fully than has yet been done. It is presumably too much to expect—I know of no guide-book which offers—help to the foreigner in discovering whether the strange newspaper, bought at hazard, is an organ of the right, left or centre, or in learning of the existence of specialist or slightly specialist publications such as the *Connoisseur*, *Financial Times*, *Country Life*, *The Field*, *The Studio*, a few of the well-established trade and technical journals, and the supplements to *The Times*. We have all longed for something of the kind when abroad, and there is no reason to suppose that some of our visitors may not weary, at least on wet days, of the Zoo. But if this simple want cannot be supplied, there are yet others. Many foreigners, and all Frenchmen, prompted by their grandfathers' account of an excursion to see the Diamond Jubilee, are curious about London's squares. These famous centres are not what they were, but a few reasonably good examples survive. Which are they ? The guide-book is silent. Again our visitor, especially if he is an American, may want to see what extensive bomb-damage looks like. Where is it ? The index of the *Blue Guide* makes no mention of it.

Passing from the negative to the positive, we are immediately drawn to the stars. There is no doubt of their intention. " Asterisks " Baedeker tells us, " are used as a mark of commendation " and

we find almost the same words in Muirhead : " Asterisks indicate points of special interest or excellence." The system has its uses, and its dangers, too ; it is apt, as Mr. Ivor Brown said the other day, to produce star-gazers rather than explorers ; if its application is to be defended, great care is needed. The allotment of stars, like the tourist, is in the hands of the editor. None of us, however, is tourist in his own district. We know all about our local stars, including those which became unattached during the war and are available for redistribution. The moment is opportune to study the method of dispersal.

In the new *Blue Guide to London*, the Zoological Gardens receive a double star, while additional stars are affixed to nine of its cages and enclosures, a total of eleven stars, or four more than the Blessed Damozel. For Regent's Park itself and its contents, botanical or architectural, one star is spared ; it is awarded to the stalls in St. Katharine's Precinct. St. James's Palace is awarded no mark " of special interest or excellence " and neither Boodle's, St. Mary-le-Strand, Christ Church (Spitalfields), St. Margaret's (Westminster), the Horse Guards, Bedford Square, the Geffrye Museum nor Downing Street, neither Covent Garden nor its church nor its opera house manages to achieve, individually or collectively, a distinction bestowed on the Giant Panda. The list could easily be duplicated, but it is sufficient to reveal a very strange sense of proportion and, surely, an odd notion of what readers, excepting big game hunters, most want to see. The purchaser of a serious and expensive guide-book is usually an educated foreigner, not a tired working-woman trying to keep her children amused. The whole tone of Baedeker or Muirhead seems, at times, to be at variance with that view. Can it be that, when the scholarly editors have completed their labours, a public relations officer plants the stars and popularizes the index ? It is hard not to see evidence of divided control.

We can still hope that the heirs of the gentleman from Leipzig are adding, to their immense array of facts, familiarity with contemporary taste. If our inclinations are not those of our parents and grandparents, the fault is neither the editors' nor even, perhaps, ours ; but if the change is ignored, the editors alone are to blame. The eighth (1927) edition of Baedeker's *Great Britain* had been, we were told, " entirely rewritten " but it was still breathing the air of its first edition, published in 1887. Another 22 years have passed ; for the new Baedeker, when it comes, there will be 62 years (and more) to be gone back over, retraced, and restarted from. Whereas practically every building which is to-day admired bears an earlier date than 1840 and hardly anything of a later date is considered tolerable, Baedeker (though " entirely re-written ") was still repeating the opinions of the year of its birth, the confident year of the Jubilee. An

analysis of the index to the 1927 edition makes the point, and those opinions, perfectly clear. From Inigo Jones to Robert Smirke, two and a half centuries of our greatest architects, 63 references ; from Sir Gilbert Scott to Sir Edwin Lutyens, approximately the last hundred years, 67 references. Only two architects, who straddle the dividing line and are therefore difficult to allot to either group, are omitted from this calculation.

It is unlikely that by opening the book anyone will find grounds for complaint. There is never a mistake to catch the eye but only, gradually making itself felt, a certain misapplication of emphasis. Take, as an example, the bridges over the Thames, a fine series belonging for the most part to the second half of the eighteenth century. Readers of the new editions might be interested to know, if they are given the chance, who designed Maidenhead Bridge, since he is a man with whose name they have, by many recent books, been made familiar ; and they might be no less interested to know that Henley's graceful bridge, which sent Horace Walpole into raptures, is due to a man of whom, in all likelihood, they have never heard. They will, if contemporary publications are any indication of the fashion, want to hear much more about the little Stuart and Georgian churches scattered among our country towns and much less about nineteenth century town halls in provincial cities. Never again, unless Mrs. Esdaile, Mr. Sacheverell Sitwell and others have wasted their time, will Baedeker be able to pass in silence over such places as Lydiard Tregoze or such monuments as Bosbury's ; to point to C. G. Cibber's statue on the Custom House at King's Lynn and yet to make no mention of Henry Bell ; to give to the 5th Duke of Devonshire all the credit for Buxton's Crescent, and to John Carr none ; to deal so summarily with the superb churches of Marshland and to give no recognizable hint at all of the group of small but notable churches near Wolverton, in north Buckinghamshire ; to find time to wave to Alfred Stevens' birthplace in Blandford but not to mention the Bastards ; to murmur "Scott" at Greta Bridge without adding "Cotman" ; to leave Trollope out of St. Cross, Papworth out of Cheltenham, Johnson out of Ashbourne, Henry Keene and Robert Adam out of High Wycombe, Nash and his model village out of Gloucestershire, Great Coxwell out of Berkshire, Gainsborough out of Ipswich, Samuel Palmer out of Shoreham and Peacock out of Wales. Tastes, admittedly, differ ; space, admittedly, is at a premium ; criticisms from one angle or another can always be directed at any guide-book. Nevertheless, I believe that many, and not the least typical, of the students of Baedeker will agree with me in thinking that there is something wrong with the balance of a compilation which can yield, in twenty minutes' skimming and dipping, a list like that just given while spending six lines and three stars on the town

hall at Manchester, six lines on the town hall at Birmingham, four lines on Keble College chapel, and a star for every Zoo, it seems, in the Kingdom.

Some of the features omitted were unadvertised until lately ; it is not entirely fair to blame the editor of a guide-book for not being first in the field of appreciation and not fair at all to blame him for not foreseeing changes of taste. If I thought that Baedeker's emphasis was right for the readers of 1927, I should have nothing to say. I do not think so. One cannot always say with confidence what one was believing and feeling twenty years ago, but there seem to be reasons for fearing that Baedeker was then, as Muirhead is now, reflecting our fathers' or even our grandfathers' tastes rather than ours.

The great guide-books are such impressive affairs, so crammed with facts and pregnant in phrase, so honest, trustworthy, level-headed and good humoured that their influence is incalculable, and their judgment as important as their knowledge. It is not too much to say that they are a national possession, their reputation a matter for pride and also for jealous guardianship. The more one uses them, the more one's affection and admiration grows. Without them we should be lost, blind and deaf, and travel, in Rome or London, Merioneth or Provence, would be little more than a dragged-out version of a day trip to Boulogne, two hours in *La Belle France*. That is the first and the last thing to be said about them, whatever the intermediate comments. But there is that space in the middle, and it is the opposite of a no-man's land.

(Throughout the war the Hon. Arnold Palmer acted as secretary to the committee (Mr. P. H. Jowett, C.B.E., Sir Kenneth Clark and Sir William Russell Flint, R.A.) which administered the Recording Britain scheme of the Pilgrim Trust. He has since been editing the four volumes of drawings chosen from the collection for reproduction by the Oxford University Press.)

THE FORTNIGHTLY LIBRARY

DIGGING FOR HISTORY

By W. THOMSON HILL

THE repellent term archaeology has not prevented the rapid growth of interest in the past. An archaeologist is not necessarily a bald and ancient bookworm. He is more likely to be an undergraduate, man or woman, giving up his vacation to digging on an open hillside. Teams of young men and girls have been at work this summer under expert direction on a number of sites. One schoolboy reported the foundations of a Roman house in a gravel pit in time to save it for expert examination. A Somerset farmer was the first to notice the dim traces in the turf of a lake village.

War has stimulated this interest ; it has destroyed ancient monuments but it has led to the discovery of others ; and it has made topical and intelligible many chapters of history. Roman Britain springs to light—and that Britain no static political conception but a high civilization in its prime and its decay. Archaeology is here the companion of history ; and in the dark age which followed the Roman occupation it becomes almost our only guide. Nearly everything has yet to be learnt about this period. Documentary sources are exhausted. Digging for history is only begun.

An illustrated brochure,* prepared by the Ministry of Works, is a record and a sign of the times. The first impression was sold out within a week of publication. So much for the notion that archaeology is dry-as-dust. This record is both learned and popular ; it assembles facts which are not available in any other form ; and it provides an introduction to the study of the past

which it would be difficult to better in the space.

The Ministry had a double task—to report on sites under threat of damage or obliteration by the needs of war, and to ensure the preservation of damaged historic buildings. A mass of new information has been obtained under the first heading and much needless destruction prevented under the second. Many prehistoric sites were discovered in the making of aerodromes and the like and carefully excavated. In the midst of war urgencies it says much for departmental co-operation that this was possible. Within a few hours of the completion of an excavation for the ends of learning the bulldozers sometimes began their work for other ends.

Thus a body of evidence has been obtained illustrating life in this island from Neolithic times onwards, often with exciting detail. Digging at Simondston Cairn, Glamorganshire, proved that coal was used in a funeral pyre about 1400 B.C. A site now marked by the main runway of the London Airport at Heathrow was found to contain the post-holes and other plain indications of a rectangular Celtic temple of the early Iron Age, perhaps about 300 B.C., and unique in this country.

The work done in preserving historic buildings includes a good deal more than rendering essential first-aid. In 1940 priceless things were being destroyed without record. The National Buildings Record was set up in this critical year, and its work continues. Many buildings, now destroyed, are preserved only in these files. Those which remain can no longer be destroyed in ignorance.

* *War and Archaeology in Britain* : The Excavation of ancient sites and the preservation of Historic Buildings. Ministry of Works. Stationery Office. 1s. 6d.

Canterbury has war wounds resembling those of London. In both cities a central area near the cathedral was flattened; and in both the incentive to excavation lies chiefly in the hope of learning more about the Roman nucleus round which all their later story groups. *War and Archaeology* has something to tell in each case, and it reproduces the useful map of the devastated area of the City of London which first appeared in *Antiquity* and subsequently (in two portions) in *The Times*. A full and fascinating record of the Canterbury digging is given in a series of publications by the Canterbury Excavation Committee; and the results have been summed up in an illustrated brochure.*

It is claimed with some confidence that while the primary object of the Canterbury excavations is "to ascertain the history of Roman Canterbury, its beginnings and its endings," they have already produced much that is of interest to the man in the street. The most notable find was a series of three mosaic panels forming part of the tessellated pavement of an important dwelling in Butchery Lane. This can now be seen and is to be preserved permanently beneath shops. It was an early reward of excavation which began in 1944 and has since been carried on every season. The urgency of rebuilding on the devastated area has however called for a speedier effort with the help of some paid labour—and funds to pay for it from lovers of Canterbury beyond the city limits.

The issues of *Roman Canterbury*† by the Excavation Committee, are full of interest. It is taken to be proved that

a pre-Roman settlement existed here before the Roman Durovernum; that the Roman town was established closely following the Claudian invasion; that it contained the houses of prosperous people in the Flavian period; and that a city wall on the present line was built not later than 200 A.D.

Hints of the occupation of Canterbury during the dark ages point to other secrets still hidden underground. Archaeology, here and elsewhere, is thus opening many doors on the past. Through them we may get more than one glimpse of things no longer remote from the present.

THE FOREIGN POLICY OF SOVIET RUSSIA, Volume II, 1936-1941, by Max Beloff. Issued under the auspices of the Royal Institute of International Affairs. *Oxford University Press*: Geoffrey Cumberlege. 21s.

"The basic and inescapable relation of the Soviet State to other States," says Mr. Beloff in the final chapter of this work, summarizing the principles of foreign policy of the Soviet Union, "is one of conflict." It would be difficult, indeed, to draw any other conclusion from this lucid, dispassionate and detailed study of the period that saw the transition from the policy of indivisible peace, collective security, and the united front, typified by Litvinov, to the naked, unashamed, but much more rapidly bankrupted isolationism and self-reliance that was inaugurated by the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact of August 1939, and ended by the German invasion of Russia in the early morning of June 22, 1941. That so many fellow-travellers of the Communist Party look back nostalgically to the former period while the inveterate opponents of Soviet Russia point triumphantly to the latter, does not alter the fact that the differing policies of the two periods sprang from the same root: the conception "that by virtue of the Marxist-Leninist ideology itself, the régime is bound to be continually threatened so long as

* *Roman Canterbury*, as so far revealed by the work of the Canterbury Excavation Committee. The Committee. 1s. 6d.

† *Roman Canterbury*: No. 1, by Sheppard Frere, F.S.A. 2s. 6d. No. 2, by Audrey Williams, F.S.A. 2s. No. 3, by Audrey Williams. 2s. 6d. No. 4, by Audrey Williams and Sheppard Frere. 3s. The Canterbury Excavation Committee.

non-communist States exist."

As Mr. Beloff points out in another passage, in which he is criticizing the view that "the Soviet Union was a State among other States, pursuing clearly defined ends"—similar to those of the Czarist régime—"by the conventional methods of *realpolitik*":

It was not until after 1945 that the re-emergence of men like Togliatti, Dimitrov, and Thorez on the world scene . . . suggested that the residence in Moscow of foreign communists might have any other object than the occasional signature of a manifesto. Similarly, the weight of historical evidence is now overwhelming against those who asserted that Communist Parties in other countries . . . could be anything but obedient executants of a policy settled in Moscow. . . . An explanation of Soviet policy which dismisses the Revolution would seem to be an explanation which neither the facts nor Soviet writings warrant.

Such conclusions are not, perhaps, altogether new. Their value lies in the relation they bear to the evidence, so thoroughly and so objectively presented by Mr. Beloff in this and the preceding volume. The question they inevitably raise is, what policy is it possible for a country such as our own to pursue in the face of this persistent, underlying Soviet mentality? Does it, for example, justify the vacillations and inconsistencies of British policy in the pre-war period, leading to the humiliation of the League of Nations by Italy over the Abyssinian war, the flouting of the non-intervention agreement over Spain by the Axis powers, and the final disaster of Munich? It by no means follows, for what is new in Soviet policy is not the Russian rejection of either morality or international law whenever these do not suit Russian policy, but the fact that Russia's *étatisme* is founded on a philosophy that, however defective, is both consistent and commands fervent loyalties. The lesson that emerges from this volume is that a firm policy based on physical strength is needed to deter the rulers of Russia from promoting their more destructive aims, for the Russians will only pursue these aims when the conditions favour them.

W. T. WELLS.

THE COMING OF THE FIRST WORLD WAR: A study in the European Balance 1878-1914, by Nicholas Mansergh. Longmans. 15s.

In his foreword Dr. Mansergh explains that this is not a history of Europe 1878-1914, but rather a reinterpretation of the events which led up to the formation of the two rival systems of alliances which divided Europe and finally to war. His object is to analyse the situations which developed and the motives and actions which brought them about. Although he assumes that our knowledge of the history of the period is great he considers that our understanding of it is in comparison slight; and that it has been misled by the various theories advanced as to the causes of the war.

In view of the variety and complexity of the issues at stake he is convinced that there was no simple or single cause: that it certainly was not a capitalist war; that it did not result from economic rivalries, though they had their influence; nor was it due to the armament race, which, he holds, was the symptom of a general sense of insecurity rather than its cause. At the beginning of the period there was no balance of power in Europe; Germany's preponderance was decisive and Bismarck had reinforced it by understandings with Russia and Austria. That preponderance legitimately used might have made for peace and been tolerable, but its abuse by Bismarck's successors who reversed his policy, necessitated the restoration of the balance. Dr. Mansergh recalls the series of crises which brought that about. Although they often arose from the rivalries of other powers it was Germany's interference and bullying methods that finally induced Britain to abandon her isolation and to throw her weight into the balance. Bismarck had sought to conciliate France and to keep clear of Austro-Russian interests in the Balkans; he had no colonial or naval ambitions which would provoke Britain or France but rather encouraged them in activities

which would keep them apart and divert their attention from Europe. Russia's Far East adventures he also welcomed.

The reversal of this policy brought France and Russia closer together and eventually caused Britain to reconcile her differences with them and to accept the triple *entente*, formerly hardly conceivable.

The balance of power thus established should have been a deterrent rather than a cause of war but the circumstances under which it had been formed created a general sense of insecurity and a belief that war was inevitable. Questions of prestige and a mistaken belief that war if it occurred would be short and decisive, a view based on past experience and supported by economists, militated against its avoidance at all costs. That it might, in spite of the composition of the opposing groups, to some extent be localized was also held. German plans, for instance, legislated for separate successive offensive campaigns against France and Russia and discounted the part Britain might play. Hitler held much the same beliefs and their falsity may have inspired present day preference for a cold to a hot war.

Dr. Mansergh has given us an interesting and useful book, although it is not easy reading.

CHARLES GWYNN

WANDERING SCHOLAR, by M. J.

Bonn. *Cohen & West*. 18s.

LOST ILLUSION, by Freda Utley.

Allen & Unwin. 10s. 6d.

Dr. Moritz Bonn is that rare and refreshing specimen, a highly intelligent student of public affairs whose vision is uninhibited by any sort of *déformation professionnelle*. He styles himself a "privileged spectator" of many of the significant happenings of our time that transformed him from a natural "homebody" (a felicitous word).

A German citizen of a well-to-do and respected Jewish family of Frankfurt, with banking connections; an Austrian on his mother's side whose

heart was therefore always in Vienna rather than in Berlin; a natural *Weltbürger* or, better said, good European—for there is nothing of the rootless wight, the *émigré* or refugee about him; he never ceased throughout his active life, to be a good, that is, genuinely liberal German—he contrived to garnish a distinguished academic career with a wealth of specialized foreign experience, mainly in the British Empire, which was not given to many Germans of his generation. To marry into a minor county family of East Anglia and become preternaturally bilingual; to spend the greater part of the two world war periods in the U.S.A., where his qualities as teacher and expositor have been fully appreciated; finally, in his later years, to direct with considerable aplomb and success the College of Commerce in Berlin, and then, when the coming of Hitler decreed that he must tear up his roots in his native country, to hold a chair at the London School of Economics and establish his spiritual domain in this country as a British subject.

Fate willed it that his first substantial research studies were of Ireland and her economic background—where he enjoyed the friendship of Sir Horace Plunkett—and of South Africa in the formative years which we associate with the Milner kindergarten.

Before 1914 Dr. Bonn played an unobtrusive rôle as an opponent of everything that Bismarck stood for; for this reason, possibly, and because he was for so many years, in our university parlance, a 'Travelling Fellow' he appears to have missed the normal academic preferment. Having accepted a post as Visiting Professor at the University of California (Berkeley) for the autumn term of 1914 he was away from Germany when war came and stayed away until March 1917. On his return he was "requisitioned" by the German Foreign Office for publicity work, but was evidently not happy in the rôle of bureaucrat, and returned to Munich to take up his college duties again before the end of

the year. He was thus a witness of the successive revolutions — socialist, communist and counter-revolutionary—in that city, of which he gives a most entertaining sketch. The contacts he had made in Berlin, and his friendship with Count Bernstorff, formerly German Ambassador in Washington, served him in good stead, and he was invited to serve on the German delegation to the Peace Conference at Versailles. Later he was associated with the Committee set up by the Weimar Government to inquire into the responsibility for the lost war, and was also called in as a reparations expert at the Genoa Conference. The portrayal of that immediate post-war period is rich in humour and illustrative anecdote, and, as a footnote to history, it may be recorded that at the Spa Conference in July 1920 (to which he had gone as a private citizen not as a delegate) his friendship with Philip Kerr—from South African days—was instrumental in averting an Allied decision to march into the Ruhr. His rôle, Dr. Bonn says with wry humour, has too often been to serve as “a speaking-tube to convey hints for unscrambling history.”

There is precious little humour about Freda Utey's story of disillusionment with Communism (that is, Socialism) as operated in Russia. It is a grim record of life in Soviet Russia during the 'thirties culminating in her husband's arrest and disappearance on a trumped-up charge. Nothing that she tells us is new, but, presented as a personal experience instead of through slabs of fact and statistics, the indictment is all the more poignant and convincing. Here is an awful warning for the well-meaning “progressive”, a type which used to abound in this country and is till the continual target of Soviet propaganda. Bertrand Russell, a personal friend, contributes a brief and forceful Introduction, and one can only echo his wish that all fellow-travellers could be induced to read the book.

WILLIAM RYDAL.

FEUDAL ORDER, by Marion Gibbs.
Cobbett Press. 7s. 6d.

The democratization of education, as shown by the ever increasing number of university extension lectures, the work of adult educational bodies, governmental and voluntary, and the extension of the school leaving age, have apparently stimulated a demand for small brochures which seek to deal, in condensed form, with one or another aspects of general knowledge. The present manual, *Feudal Order*, is such a short treatise; it is described as “a study of the origins and development of English Feudal Society” and, for those who have neither the inclination nor the time to study medievalism at all fully, it may be said in a sense to fulfil its purpose which is said to be “to help the solitary student.” He is warned that he will not always find this, and other essays of the Cobbett Press, easy. The book is dry and factual; it cannot, save when dealing with ecclesiastical matters, fairly be criticized on the score of accuracy; it contains the most recent expositions of the period, condensed into a desiccated narrative. Was it really necessary to make this most fascinating subject so obscure and difficult of comprehension?

It is conceded that “an English baron of the thirteenth century had more in common with a member of his own class in France or Germany than with the peasantry on his estate.” The place assigned to the Church in this class conscious society was to “idealize and sanction” the relationships of this divided society, more closely integrating it to the other feudal kingdoms of Christendom. The canon law, it is said, was created in the feudal period; this surely is not the case—the earliest canonical collections received in the west were from Dionysius, a monk of the sixth century. In the ninth, this digest was sent by Pope Hadrian I to Charlemagne, though it is true that the compilations of Burchard of Worms and Anselm of Lucca date from the eleventh and Ivo

of Chartres from the twelfth, as does the work of the famous Gratian. Indeed the whole attitude of the author to the medieval Church lacks that objectivity which she well displays when dealing with legal and economic problems. The following is an instance of her method of presentation: "In England no mass popular belief responds to the suggestion that life . . . only ends well, in Heaven as opposed to Hell, if the unhappy traveller begs for divine assistance from his 'patron' saints and the 'holy mother of God'." The derisive quotation marks are the author's. All this is offensive to the "mass opinion" represented by several million Catholics in England and is irrelevant to the main purpose of the book, which might have been contented to assert that, in the middle ages, all but a few discredited heretics did so believe.

It is important to realize, as is here stated, that: "Barons and knights

until the later twelfth century were still essentially an alien occupying army ruling a conquered people, though the peasantry were subjected to compulsory labour even before the Conquest." The lord, the author declares, gained his living by exploiting his peasantry. Politics, she comments, had as close a connection with economics under feudalism as in our time.

By the middle of the twelfth century "the initial phase in the growth of feudalism was over," internal order had been secured under Henry I—the civil wars in Stephen's and Henry III's time were but interludes on the way to that powerful monarchy so firmly established by Edward I. Thereafter "the growth of the merchant and middle classes, soaked in, though critical of, the material civilization and ideology of feudalism" prepared the way for Tudor Absolutism, which the non-papal Church, now under kingly headship, could do nothing to abate.

HENRY SLESSER.



GOVERNMENT PUBLICATIONS

Ministry of Health. Report for the year ended 31st March, 1948, in which intensive preparations were in hand for the National Health Service. The Report of the Chief Medical Officer for the year ended 31st December, 1947, is included.
Cmd. 7734. 5s. (5s. 4d.)

Metropolitan Police. The Report of the Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis for the year 1948, presented under the following headings: Review of the Year; Administration of the Force; Recruiting and Training; Crime; Traffic; Seven Statistical Tables.
Cmd. 7737. 1s. 6d. (1s. 8d.)

Statistical Review of England and Wales for the Six Years 1940-1946. Vol. 1. A Commentary on the Medical Statistics for the years affected directly by the War.
6s. 6d. (6s. 11d.)

Prices in brackets include postage

• H. M. STATIONERY OFFICE

York House, Kingsway, London, W.C.2. (Post Orders: P.O. Box 569, London S.E.1.) ; Edinburgh, 2 : 13A Castle Street ; Manchester, 1 : 39, King Street ; Birmingham, 3 : 2, Edmund Street ; Cardiff, 1, St. Andrew's Crescent ; Bristol, 1 : Tower Lane ; Belfast, 80, Chichester Street — or through any bookseller.

THE NATIONAL HEALTH SERVICE, by Charles Hill and John Woodcock. *Christopher Johnson*. 16s.

This objective book will be of the greatest possible use not only to members of the medical profession but to others who are concerned with the administration of the various phases of the new service.

The chapters dealing with the general medical services and the part which medical practitioners must take in their administration are admirably lucid and set out the position without prejudice or criticism, and the authors have not overlooked the importance of dealing with other aspects of the subject, such as an explanation of the general hospital plan and its administrative structure.

The table of contents and the index show that the statutory provisions and, perhaps more important, the complicated regulations made under the Act, have been dealt with clearly and comprehensively. This makes the book much more readable to the layman than would be a mere annotation of the statutory provisions. Critics of the Bill complained of the vast amount of clerical work which would fall on the doctors. Medical practitioners taking part in the service are expected to do a great deal of form-filling which, with some thought, it should be possible to reduce. For instance, a practitioner is required to issue, free of charge, any certificates reasonably required by his patient "under or for the purpose of any enactment." The forms of certificates which he may therefore be required to give are set out in 23 categories under 21 main statutes. Here is an opportunity for simplification.

Other subjects treated in detail are the general dental service and the pharmaceutical service. It is perhaps not generally appreciated that patients are not required to register on the list of a particular dentist, and treatment under the scheme may be obtained from

any dentist whose name appears on any executive council list. It is not necessary for the patient to obtain any authority or application form before seeking treatment by the dentist of his choice, but this does not mean that he can at once obtain any treatment required as the dentist providing treatment in his own surgery must complete a dental estimate form provided by the local executive council. Those who are still in the habit of paying for their own dental treatment will be interested to see the list of charges which the dentist can make if he does work under the new service. From the description of their duties it seems that the dentists have even more form-filling to do than the doctors.

The book concludes with appendices giving useful information as to the constitution and areas of regional hospital boards, teaching hospitals and other general matters. The regulations governing pay-bed accommodation in hospitals are set out in full together with a long list of the various types of operations in respect of which fees of varying amounts may be charged, a further indication of the value the book will be to those who want to avoid pitfalls in administering the new service.

JOHN MOSS.

DOCTOR FAUSTUS: The Life of the German Composer Adrian Leverkühn as told by a Friend, by Thomas Mann. *Secker & Warburg*. 15s.

RAINTREE COUNTY, by Ross Lockridge. *Macdonald*. 15s.

A SORT OF TRAITORS, by Nigel Balchin. *Collins*. 9s. 6d.

Thomas Mann's new book, when read, is impressive, but the task before the reader is a stiff one. Several factors may account for this: the tale, a modern version of the Faust legend, tells the life-story of a fictitious musical genius, Adrian Leverkühn (1885-1940) who has sold his soul and body to the devil in return for twenty-four years of

musical creation of the first order. Reluctantly, obliquely, and discursively, the narrative is unfolded by the composer's lifelong friend Zeitblom, Ph.D., a scrupulous and shocked scholar; the text is full of erudition, philosophic, political and religious, and extended musical criticism. Furthermore, this massive canvas is, as Mr. Lowe-Porter the translator observes, a "woven tapestry of symbolism." The fate of the hero is paralleled by the fate of modern Germany. "Germany, the hectic on her cheek, was reeling—then at the height of her dissolute triumphs, about to gain the whole world by virtue of the one pact she was minded to keep, which she had signed with her blood." Lastly, there are the real difficulties of translation, for which the translator apologises in a Note, difficulties arising from the symbolism, dialect, and passages "resorting to an archaic style and spelling." One is baffled sometimes by a sentence like the following: "But my conviction, resting on unequivocal evidence, is that the maternal experiences from so tragic and wretched a return, in all its grief, some appeasement as well." Yet the book has much beauty of writing too, as in the chapter describing the composer's endearing nephew, before the child dies horribly of meningitis. It has also profundity when tackling subjects and problems of immediate significance to our age.

Raintree County is of an even more massive spread, being no less than 1,056 close pages! Some of it is dull, but a great deal of it emphatically is not. Claiming to be the story of a single day in 1892, we are given in a multitude of flashbacks the life of a courageous dreamer, John Wickliff Shawnessy who grew up in the state of Indiana. "The time had come for John Shawnessy to make a godlike exertion, to produce a masterwork, a book that would usher in the Golden Age of the American Republic . . . So he would write the epic of the American Republic and its people, the greatest poem ever written."

So too, we suspect, with the author attempting the enormous task of writing

the Great American novel which should express the spirit of America in the days when her future seemed universally great with promise. The book was published and had a "best seller" success in the States. And then tragically, his publishers tell us, Mr. Lockridge, perhaps in the creative void left after years of gruelling work, committed suicide. Or did he fear a too great success? Or was he even ultimately disappointed?

For the book has serious faults, such as rhetoric and incoherence. There are inflated mystical, lyrical outbursts about the soul of the Republic, about Abraham Lincoln, about the mythical Raintree County. There are too many pastiche passages of James Joyce's *Ulysses* and too many reminders of the style of the late Thomas Wolfe. But the straightforward narrative—the account for example of the Civil War—is excellent and exciting, and there are attractive women of real flesh and blood, interesting characters like the Senator and the Rabelaisian "Perfessor". *Raintree County* is patchy, and is intermittently rhapsodical, scholarly, erotic, historical, harsh and tender. While less than a masterpiece, it is a more than competent novel, with something in it for everybody.

Mr. Nigel Balchin's *A Sort of Traitors* is in another category, and is much the most readable of the three. To admirers of *The Small Back Room* and *Mine Own Executioner* here is the mixture much as before, but the dialogue is better than ever, with more humour. There is a painful love affair. The theme is one of conflicting human loyalty. A group of scientists has discovered the clue to the avoidance of epidemic plagues, and comes into headlong collision with the Government who wish to prevent publication for fear of the help this may give to a potential enemy in wartime. The scientific atmosphere is convincingly conveyed, and there is a delicious interview with a Cabinet Minister, whose origin prompts reflection.

JOSEPH BRADDOCK.

BOOKS ON THE TABLE

Like good wine, Lord David Cecil's advice on *READING AS ONE OF THE FINE ARTS* needs no bush. Nevertheless, his inaugural lecture as Goldsmith's Professor of English before the University of Oxford (*Geoffrey Cumberlege*. 2s.) is decanted so modestly that only connoisseurs may pause to sip; while all the time he is the ideal mentor for the random reader whose appetite is voracious enough to be indiscriminating. In a few sentences, Lord David is able to find comparisons between Tennyson and Pope where most critics would be content with contrasts. Then, "the more we are alive to remark the presence of the aesthetic quality the more certainly do we perceive its absence," and, in another way of saying that love is not blind, he shows how supple the taste may grow by training. Just as Shelley saw that "all that we wish to stay, tempts and then flies" so does Lord David recognize that dreams exceed reality but, where the Shelley poem stops at stating the fact, he joyfully points to a wide prospect of compensation in art and appreciation.

Crafts and Art

In *AN INTRODUCTION TO AESTHETICS* (*Hutchinson's University Library*. 7s. 6d.) E. F. Carritt broadens the discussion with such aspects of creative activity as formal and representative art, expression, emotion, classical and romantic criticism, and form and subject in poetry, neatly summing up the whole with:

The aesthetic experience seems to be not the criticism of life, nor its theory nor its furtherance—terms proper to morals, to science and to mental or physical hygiene—but the sympathetic contemplation of its delights and of its tragedy.

—It is not a step from the sublime to *POPULAR ART IN THE UNITED STATES* by Erwin O. Christensen (*King Penguin*. 2s. 6d.). The first horrid thought that this might be concerned with magazine polish was dispelled by the numerous

illustrations from the Index of American Design of the Washington Gallery of Art. These are of figurehead, of cigar store Indian, of tavern sign, of rug and quilt, of mirror and handbox, of chest and trivet, of a retable panel and of a station of the Cross, from among the many objects created by people who carried on the traditions of Spain, Germany, England, "on New England waterfronts, on the deserts of New Mexico, among the hills of Tennessee, on the prairies of the Midwest and in the rolling country of Pennsylvania." Made by hand in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, and outlets for self-expression as they were, these have now become part of a nation's cultural heritage and object lessons in contentment.

Music, when soft voices die

Penguin Books have also issued the first three of a series of pocket scores (2s. 6d. each). They are *MOZART: SYMPHONY No. 40 IN G MINOR*, *J. S. BACH: BRANDENBURG CONCERTO No. 3 IN G*, and *BEETHOVEN: CORIOLAN and EGMONT* together. In each there is a helpful Introduction by the general editor, Gordon Jacob, and a Biographical Note by F. Bonavia, Frank Howes and W. McNaught respectively and they have been issued in good time for the Albert Hall season of promenade concerts.—Many who feel these are not what they were (or, more accurately, that the audience is not what it was) will be glad to stir the memory with *THE PROMS* by Thomas Russell (*Max Parrish*. 7s. 6d.). The illustrations are copious, many excellently nostalgic, and the author's opinion that the twelve vintage years began near the end of the 1914-1918 war is enthusiastically corroborated. He mentions the faintings on those Wagner evenings; does he remember one of them when the librarian had put out the wrong music for about half the players, I wonder, or the occasion when old Ben Davies angrily reproved a first

violin—a woman alas—for talking while he sang? These were the times when Eric Coates sometimes rose from the violas to take a bow at Sir Henry Wood's gracious beckoning, when Sir Henry would lead on a Rosina Buckman between the stands, like a tug the *Queen Mary* in the Solent, when, after hours perched on a barrier of wood across the entrance, some of us who practised the piano would race across the Queen's Hall to the row of seats where we could kneel up in front of the instrument. We were thus literally at the conductor's feet—and wanted no other fate. Less vociferous than our "teen-ager" and "bobby soxer" counterparts, we went home night after night (for a season ticket was cheap) in a daze of happiness, full of all the poured out riches. Says Mr. Russell: "the concerts can again become what they once were—the greatest educative force in symphonic music the world has ever seen."

Shorn of obscurity

Still with the arts, a translation into modern English of *VISIONS FROM PIERS PLOWMAN* by Nevill Coghill (*Phoenix House*. 12s. 6d.), whose work on the poem in a B.B.C. third programme was well founded, will surprise those who encountered it first in less attractive dress. He has made some cuts, mainly of theological disquisition, and has added the names—in the style of a play—of the dialogue speakers. He has even translated in footnotes the less familiar of the Latin tags with which William Langland peppered the poem. The result of such careful and scholarly treatment is a *Piers Plowman*, as farmer, priest and bishop, whose life story and spiritual pilgrimage are woven into what now shows clearly as a masterpiece of English literature with a meaning applicable no less to the twentieth century than to the fourteenth.

As Shakespeare says

And now to the spring of 1564, where all the roads of literature meet. Hesketh Pearson has reissued *A LIFE*

OF SHAKESPEARE: With an Anthology of Shakespeare's Poetry (*Carroll & Nicholson*. 9s. 6d.). The author, as Mr. Shaw said on its original publication, "is a genuine soaker in Shakespeare" and his book performs the seemingly impossible by satisfying and stimulating at the same time. This is due in part perhaps to his judicious use of quotations; he he not only arouses applause for their aptness but incites the reader to cap them with others from the same inexhaustible source.

Lasting charm

KATHERINE MANSFIELD AND OTHER LITERARY PORTRAITS by John Middleton Murry (*Peter Nevill*. 12s. 6d.) seems also to imply that good things may be repeated, for some of its essays have been read elsewhere. They pass the test of time, so that, except for a modification in dates that he has made, there is nothing in them apparently the author would now retract. There are studies of Keats, Shelley, Coleridge, Wordsworth, De Quincey, Matthew Arnold, Andrew Bradley, Richard Hillary, Max Plowman, Karl Mannheim, George Chapman, F. V. Branford and Thomas Hardy, all penetrating and all eloquent of the literary critic of quality that Mr. Murry is.—Yet another pleasant reappearance is Ernest Rhys' Introduction to THOMAS DEKKER (*Ernest Benn: The Mermaid Series*. 8s. 6d.). And here too is the text of four more of the plays which helped to feed the stream of the Elizabethan drama: *The Shoemaker's Holiday*, *The Honest Whore*, *Old Fortunatus* and *The Witch of Edmonton*. Dekker's works, in the words of Rhys, "leave a sense of brightness and human encouragement whose charm lingers when many more careful monuments of literary effort are forgotten."

Now it is time to go on a journey through the heart of England with Douglas Goldring in *HOME GROUND* (*Macdonald*. 12s. 6d.). From Dover his itinerary includes Salisbury,

Cheltenham, Lichfield, Peterborough, Huntingdon and Bedford. As one whose blood relatives and remote forbears too are natives of Warwick where, notwithstanding all the titillations of its proximity to Stratford-on-Avon and its own coloured history, dignity not to say aloofness is preserved, this reader confesses that his account of the town was turned to first. It is gratifying that the Holbeins, the Rubens, the Vandycks and the Velasquez in the Castle astonished him and that St. Mary's and its tombs, the Leicester Hospital and Landor's Georgian birth-place called forth his delight. "Och," said his chance Irish acquaintance, "you can't beat Warwick." But in fairness to all the other towns, it must be said that they are dealt with quite as attractively. It is in Mr. Goldring's contacts with human beings and their institutions that he sometimes displays a touch of querulousness which, however deserved, slightly prejudices his candidature as the perfect companion.

Through streets broad and narrow

A first visit to Dublin last year produced a wish for an architect companion, so exuberant and varied is this city "built up of historical layers" between mountains and sea. In that specialist capacity John Harvey's DUBLIN (*Batsford*. 15s.) is therefore belated; but though it is commended particularly to the attention of the new visitor, who will find his rambles enriched and his cries of wonder disciplined by its previous study, and by its bed and board proximity during the holiday, this by no means exhausts its possibilities. With the help of its many fine photographs, the author recalls quiet squares of noble houses, sweeping façades, the gleam of the Liffey, and beauty embedded in squalor. Slums in mean streets, yes, but rows of graceful Regency doorways with airy fanlights, in wide roads—which must have been part of the most

ambitious of town planning projects—made raucous with poverty, are a contradiction unknown in London or Paris. Yet, in spite of the painful contrasts, Dublin is a city to love and Mr. Harvey's a book to keep fresh its extraordinary charm.

Picturesque knavery

Not inferior to the Irish variety is the wit of GREEN GROW THE RUSHES by Howard Clewes (*The Bodley Head*. 9s. 6d.). This is a tale (in the irresponsible tradition of the *Passport to Pimlico* and *Whisky Galore* films) of liquor smuggling in an imaginary cinque port. Half way through the book the guilty trawler is washed by a tidal wave into the middle of Mr. Bainbridge's land. The efforts of the smugglers, who are already harried by the snoopers from the Ministry of Agriculture, to dispose of the booty provide by no means the most ludicrous sequence of events. Sometimes the laugh is a little wry; though no attempt is made to glamourize the deceiving of Customs, and Rupert Hammond at least is not deceived in himself, the moralist in the reader is ever in danger of being smothered by the inevitable notion that smuggling is "adventure" and should be exempt from sordid retribution. And, apart from the town's general discomfort from too much enforced drinking, retribution there is none. But light-heartedness is not to be despised and this is a book that far transcends in appeal the "buffoonery" claimed for it by the blurb.

Solemnity deferred

Due to autobiographical protuberances, the desired shapeliness of these three pages has not been wholly achieved, and science, psychology and a "Current Problem" are still on the table. Crowded out now, they take their place at the head of next month's queue.

GRACE BANYARD.